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CHANGING THE BATHWATER AND KEEPING THE BABY:1 
EXPLORING NEW WAYS OF EVALUATING INTENT IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL DISCRIMINATION CASES 
BROWNE C. LEWIS* 
ABSTRACT 
Minorities in the United States live in areas that are heavily polluted.  In 
addition to dealing with the pollution generated by their neighborhoods, 
minorities often are exposed to environmental hazards that provide services 
for the entire community.  The problem of the disproportionate placement of 
environmental hazards in minority communities is well documented.  A 
primary cause of the inequitable distribution of environmental hazards in this 
country is environmental discrimination based on class and race. 
Persons combating environmental discrimination have attempted to get 
relief relying upon the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Unfortunately, plaintiffs in environmental discrimination cases have hit a brick 
wall—the requirement that they prove the decision to place the environmental 
hazard in their neighborhood was motivated by an intent to discriminate on the 
part of the decision-makers.  In response, advocates have proposed replacing 
intent as the evidentiary requirement in Equal Protection Cases.  If properly 
applied, the intent requirement is a perfectly viable evidentiary method.  
Therefore, I propose keeping the intent requirement and changing the manner 
 
 1. This title is a twist on the proverb: “Don’t throw the baby out with the bathwater.” There 
is some controversy surrounding the origin of the proverb.  The following is one view: 
Baths equaled a big tub filled with hot water.  The man of the house had the privilege of 
the nice clean water, then all the other sons and men, then the women and finally the 
children.  Last of all the babies.  By then the water was so dirty you could actually lose 
someone in it.  Hence the saying, “Don’t throw the baby out with the bath water.” 
More Eccentricities of the English Language, http://www.wordskit.com/language/legends/ 
bathwater.shtml (last visited Feb. 9, 2005). 
* Assistant Professor, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law, B.A., Grambling State 
University, J.D., University of Minnesota, L.L.M., Energy & Environmental Law, University of 
Houston, M.P.A., Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs.  I would like to thank the 
following persons for their assistance in the preparation of this article: Professor Pamela Wilkins, 
Professor Robin Magee, Professor Imani Perry, Professor Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Professor 
Camille Nelson, Professor Bernie D. Jones, Dean Mark Gordon, Urooj Usman, and Melodee 
Henderson. 
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in which the courts determine if the plaintiffs have satisfied the requirement.  
The courts should presume intent if the plaintiffs are able to demonstrate that 
the decision to place the environmental hazard in their neighborhood was 
unreasonable. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Given the United States’ legacy of discriminatory activity, in Professor 
Robert D. Bullard’s2 opinion, it is not surprising that the country’s 
environmental laws, regulations, and policies have not been consistently 
applied across all sectors of the populace.  For instance, low-income families 
and minorities are forced to tolerate an unequal burden of the country’s 
“pollution problems.”  Consequently, persons in those communities are 
exposed to the public health threats that accompany environmental hazards.3  
Professor Bullard was one of the first persons to write about the rampant 
environmental discrimination in the United States.  According to Professor 
Bullard, the current environmental protection regime is designed to provide 
greater benefits and protection for white persons living in middle- and upper-
income communities while allocating costs to low-income and minority 
persons.4  Therefore, Professor Bullard and others advocate reconstructing the 
current environmental protection regime to address the issue of environmental 
discrimination.5 
For years, governmental decision-makers have contributed to the 
disproportionate placement of environmental hazards in low-income6 and 
 
 2. Bullard is one of the leading experts in the field of environmental justice.  He was one of 
the planners of the First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit. 
 3. Robert D. Bullard, Introduction to UNEQUAL PROTECTION: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR, at xv, vv (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994) [hereinafter UNEQUAL 
PROTECTION]. 
 4. Id. at xv–xvi. 
 5. Bullard states, 
[T]he dominant environmental protection paradigm (1) institutionalizes unequal 
enforcement; (2) trades human health for profit; (3) places the burden of proof on the 
“victims,” not on the polluting industry; (4) legitimates human exposure to harmful 
chemicals, pesticides, and hazardous substances; (5) promotes “risky” technologies, such 
as incinerators; (6) exploits the vulnerability of economically and politically 
disenfranchised communities; (7) subsidizes ecological destruction; (8) creates an 
industry around risk assessment; (9) delays cleanup actions; and (10) fails to develop 
pollution prevention as the overarching and dominant strategy. 
Id. at xvi. 
 6. When dealing with environmental justice issues, advocates have identified the low-
income population in an affected area by using the annual statistical poverty thresholds from the 
Bureau of the Census’s Current Population Reports, Series P-60 on Income and Poverty.  See 
COUNCIL ON ENVT. QUALITY, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: 
GUIDANCE UNDER THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 25 (1997), available at 
http://www.wct.doc.gov/env_justice/pdf/ justice.pdf [hereinafter CEQ GUIDANCE].  However, for 
the purpose of clarity, I am using the term as defined in the housing area.  A “low-income family” 
is a family that has income that does not exceed 80 percent of the median income for the area 
where the family resides.  42 U.S.C. § 1437(b)(2) (2000). 
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minority7 communities.8  Environmental discrimination based upon class and 
race is one possible cause of the unequal distribution of environmental hazards.  
The recognition that low-income and minority persons have been unequally 
treated in the environmental protection arena led to the development of the 
environmental justice movement.9  “Environmental justice” is the term used to 
refer to the steps that have been taken to remedy environmental 
discrimination.10  Persons discussing the problem of the disproportionate 
placement of environmental hazards in low-income and minority 
neighborhoods have also used the terms “environmental racism”11 and 
 
 7. In the environmental justice arena, the term “minority” is used to refer to the following 
four major racial and ethnic groups: (1) Blacks, (2) American Indians and Alaska Natives, (3) 
Asians and Pacific Islanders, and (4) Hispanics.  CEQ GUIDANCE, supra note 6, at 25.  In the 
context of this Article, “minority populations” broadly refers to all persons except non-Hispanic 
whites.  See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-95-84, HAZARDOUS AND 
NONHAZARDOUS WASTE: DEMOGRAPHICS OF PEOPLE LIVING NEAR WASTE FACILITIES 17 n.2  
(June 1995), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1995/rc95084.pdf [hereinafter 
GAO/RCED-95-84]. 
 8. In this Article, I use the term “environmental hazards” to refer to projects that pollute the 
environment and those that have the potential to pollute. 
 9. The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) defines environmental 
justice as: 
The fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, 
national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation, and 
enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies.  Fair treatment means that 
no group of people, including racial, ethnic, or socioeconomic group should bear a 
disproportionate share of the negative environmental consequences resulting from 
industrial, municipal, and commercial operations or the execution of federal, state, local, 
and tribal programs and policies. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FINAL GUIDANCE FOR INCORPORATING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
CONCERNS IN EPA’S NEPA COMPLIANCE ANALYSES § 1.1.1 (Apr. 1998), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/ej/ej_guidance_nepa_epa0498.pdf [hereinafter 
EPA GUIDANCE]; see also Envtl. Prot. Agency, Evironmental Justice, http://www.epa.gov/ 
compliance/environmental justice (last visited Oct. 6, 2005). 
 10. Major Willie A. Gunn, From the Landfill to the Other Side of the Tracks: Developing 
Empowerment Strategies to Alleviate Environmental Injustice, 22 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1227, 1235 
(1996) (citing Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 
(1994)). 
 11. The term “environmental racism” was invented by Dr. Benjamin Chavis, Jr. in 1982. He 
defined the term as: 
racial discrimination in environmental policy[-]making and the unequal enforcement of 
environmental laws and regulations.  It is the deliberate targeting of people of color 
communities for toxic waste facilities and the official sanctioning of a life threatening 
presence of poisons and pollutants in people of color communities.  It is also manifested 
in the history of excluding people of color from the leadership of the environmental 
movement. 
Robert M. Frye, Environmental Injustice: The Failure of American Civil Rights and 
Environmental Law to Provide Equal Protection from Pollution, 3 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
53, 56 (1993) (quoting Environmental Racism: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Civil 
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“environmental equity.”12  In this Article, the term “environmental 
discrimination” is used to refer to the practice of disproportionately locating 
environmental hazards in low-income and minority communities.  The core 
premise of this Article focuses on the use of the Equal Protection Clause to 
combat environmental discrimination.  Thus, I will be dealing exclusively with 
the location of environmental hazards in minority communities. 
After an environmental hazard has been placed in a minority community, 
the residents might not feel the negative impact for several years.  Whenever 
the members of a community experience adverse consequences because of an 
environmental hazard, persons seeking to help them typically have three main 
objectives.  The first goal is to have the environmental hazard put out of 
operation.13  The second goal is to receive compensation for persons who have 
been injured by the environmental hazard.14  The final goal is to prevent new 
environmental hazards from being placed in and near the impacted 
community.15  When the persons affected are minorities, one of the primary 
tools advocates have attempted to use to achieve their goals is the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.16 
A substantial amount of evidence shows that federal, state, and local 
governmental decision-makers have permitted a disproportionate number of 
environmental hazards, including hazardous waste incinerators and harmful 
 
and Constitutional Rights, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 3, 1993) (testimony of Dr. Benjamin F. 
Chavis, Jr., Executive Director, United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice); see also 
Rev. Benjamin F. Chavis, Jr., Foreword to CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES 
FROM THE GRASSROOTS 3, 3 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1993) [hereinafter GRASSROOTS]. 
 12. The term “environmental equity” has been used by the EPA to refer to “the distribution 
and effects of environmental problems and the policies and processes to reduce differences in 
who bears environmental risks.”  ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING 
RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES 2 (1992), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/ 
publications/ej/reducing_risk_com_vol1.pdf [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY].  According 
to its workgroup report, the EPA used the term because “it most readily lends itself to scientific 
risk analysis.”  Id. 
 13. See ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND  ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY 49 (1990) (discussing how members of a predominantly minority community organized 
to have a lead smelter put out of operation). 
 14. Id. at 44 (discussing how minority residents organized to halt the construction of a 
landfill in their subdivision). 
 15. Kathy Seward Northern, Battery and Beyond: A Tort Law Response to Environmental 
Racism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 485, 535 (1997); see also Kirsten H. Engel, 
Brownfield Initiatives and Environmental Justice: Second-Class Cleanups or Market-Based 
Equity?, 13 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 317, 329 (1997–1998) (discussing attempts by 
persons combating environmental discrimination to get “legislative moratoriums” passed to 
prevent the placement of additional environmental hazards in minority communities that are 
already over-saturated with pollution-generating activities). 
 16. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1. 
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industrial processes, to be placed in minority communities.17  Governmental 
authorities also have been remiss in enforcing environmental regulations in 
those communities.18  As a consequence of this apparent unequal treatment 
under the law, advocates have attempted to use the Equal Protection Clause to 
challenge the placement of environmental hazards in minority communities on 
the ground that the government decision-maker was racially discriminatory in 
approving the activity.19 
Environmental discrimination cases have been largely unsuccessful 
because plaintiffs have been unable to prove discriminatory intent on the part 
of the decision-maker.20  In the absence of negligence, persons usually are only 
legally accountable for their intentional actions.  Hence, discriminatory intent 
should not be replaced as the standard of proof in environmental discrimination 
cases.  Nonetheless, fairness dictates that the manner in which the courts 
evaluate whether or not the intent requirement has been met should be 
modified.  Under the current system, even after proving disparate impact, in 
order to satisfy the intent requirement, a plaintiff must prove that the decision-
maker’s action was motivated by an intent to discriminate.21Instead of 
mandatory proof of conscious, purposeful discriminatory intent, the court 
should analyze the facts to see if there is a valid reason to presume 
discriminatory intent on the part of the decision-maker. 
This paper is divided into four parts.  Part one consists of a general 
overview of the problem of environmental discrimination.  Part two gives a 
brief discussion of relevant Equal Protection jurisprudence.  The section begins 
with a summary of general Equal Protection law.  Then, the section analyzes 
the primary cases that established the foundation of modern-day Equal 
Protection doctrine.  Part three examines the current application of the intent 
requirement in environmental discrimination cases.  To that end, the section 
reviews the outcome of three of the early environmental discrimination cases, 
and speculates about the components that are necessary to prepare a successful 
Equal Protection challenge in the environmental arena.  Part four consists of an 
extensive analysis of the debate over the validity of the intent requirement.  
The section starts by encapsulating a few of the proposed theories put forth to 
replace or modify the intent requirement.  The section ends with my suggestion 
for refining the current application of the intent standard to make the process 
fairer to the plaintiffs in environmental discrimination cases. 
 
 17. Northern, supra note 15, at 535. 
 18. Id. 
 19. M. Patrice Benford, Note, Life, Liberty & the Pursuit of Clean Air: Fight for 
Environmental Equality, 20 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 269, 275 (1995); see also R.I.S.E., Inc. v. 
Kay, 768 F. Supp 1144, 1149 (E.D. Va. 1991). 
 20. See Part II, infra, for a discussion of the three key environmental discrimination cases 
that proves this assertion. 
 21. R.I.S.E., 768 F. Supp. at 1149. 
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I.  BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM 
The problem of environmental discrimination has been documented in 
several studies and discussed in numerous books and law review articles.  
Therefore, I only will briefly highlight the information contained in those 
sources. 
After a protest by black residents in Warren County, North Carolina,22 the 
United States General Accounting Office (GAO) sponsored a study to 
determine the extent of environmental discrimination in America.23  As a result 
of its observations, the GAO concluded that a correlation existed between the 
decisions to place hazardous waste landfills in an area and the race and income 
level of the people living in the area.24 
Governmental agencies were not the only organizations concerned about 
the adverse impact environmental hazards had on low-income and minority 
persons.  In 1987, the United Church of Christ (UCC) did its own analysis of 
the problem.25After analyzing all of the data, the UCC determined that race, 
not socioeconomic status, accounted for the fact that certain communities in 
the United States had more hazardous waste facilities than other 
communities.26 
 
 22. In 1982, a coalition of civil rights groups protested the placement of a landfill in a black 
county.  See Gunn, supra note 10, at 1228 (citing Marcia Coyle, When Movements Coalesce, 
NAT’L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S10.) 
 23. As a part of the information-gathering process, GAO staff met with an official of the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference to discuss racial issues surrounding selection of the 
Warren County PCB landfill site.  GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-83-168, SITING OF 
HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC 
STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES 2 (1983) [hereinafter GAO/RCED-83-168].  The 
participants in the study examined landfills in the eight states that compose EPA’s Region IV 
(Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and 
Tennessee).  Id. 
 24. ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY, supra note 12, § 2.2.1 (citing GAO/RCED-83-168, supra 
note 23).  The persons conducting the study discovered that three of the four commercial 
hazardous waste facilities in the region were in predominately African American communities 
and the fourth was in a low-income community.  GAO/RCED-83-168, supra note 23, at 1.  
Furthermore, at least twenty-six percent of the population living in all four communities had 
incomes below the poverty level.  Id.  African Americans made up the majority of the persons 
living in poverty.  Id. 
 25. As a part of the study, the UCC examined RCRA commercial hazardous waste facilities 
across the country.  GAO/RCED-95-84, supra note 7, at 14 (citing COMM’N FOR RACIAL 
JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A 
NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES 
WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES (1987) [hereinafter UCC STUDY]); see also BULLARD, supra 
note 13, at 17.  The UCC study was more comprehensive than the GAO report because the 
analysts focused on the entire United States.  See Frye, supra note 11, at 59. 
 26. According to the UCC’s report, communities with a single hazardous waste facility had 
twice as many people of color as did communities without such a facility.  UCC STUDY, supra 
note 25, at xiii, cited in Northern, supra note 15, at 500.  In addition, the study reported that 
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The GAO and UCC reports spawned considerable debate about the 
inequitable distribution of environmental hazards.  For example, in 1990, at a 
conference held at the University of Michigan, participants presented various 
reports studying the distribution of environmental hazards by race and 
income.27  Afterwards, the conference members gave the information compiled 
at the conference to then-EPA Administrator William Reilly and urged the 
agency to conduct an internal investigation into the matter.28 
In 1992, a study published by the National Law Journal (NLJ) reported that 
the EPA consistently was negligent in its enforcement efforts in low-income 
and minority communities.29  The NLJ study was based upon findings from an 
eight-month investigation that focused on the connection between race and 
socioeconomic status and the enforcement of environmental law.30  The NLJ 
reviewed every environmental lawsuit filed in the seven years preceding the 
study and every residential toxic waste site included in the Superfund 
program.31 
Like any form of discrimination, environmental discrimination has been 
acknowledged as a major problem.32  Legal scholars and persons seeking to 
combat environmental discrimination have suggested different solutions to the 
problem.33  The next part of the paper deals with the utility of the Equal 
 
communities with two or more facilities had more than three times the population of people of 
color as communities without such sites.  ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY, supra note 12, § 2.2.1. 
 27. Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Environmental Injustice: Weighing Race and Class As 
Factors in the Distribution of Environmental Hazards, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 921, 923 (1992); see 
also Joseph Ursic, Note, Finding a Remedy for Environmental Justice: Using 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to 
Fill in a Title VI Gap, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 497, 499 (2002). 
 28. Mohai & Bryant, supra note 27, at 499. 
 29. See Claire L. Hasler, Comment, The Proposed Environmental Justice Act: “I Have a 
(Green) Dream,” 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 417, 425–427 (1994) (discussing findings of NLJ 
study); see also Robert B. Wiygul & Sharon Carr Harrington, Environmental Justice in Rural 
Communities: Part One: RCRA, Communities, and Environmental Justice, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 
405, 419 (1993–1994). 
 30. Eileen Gauna, Federal Environmental Citizen Provisions: Obstacles and Incentives on 
the Road to Environmental Justice, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 18 (1995). 
 31. Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, The Federal Government, in Its Cleanup of 
Hazardous Sites and Its Pursuit of Polluters, Favors White Communities over Minority 
Communities Under Environmental Laws Meant to Provide Equal Protection for All Citizens, A 
National Law Journal Investigation Has Found, 15 NAT’L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S2. 
 32. Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice: Bridging the Gap Between Environmental Laws 
and “Justice,” 47 AM. U. L. REV. 221, 222 (1997); see also Robert D. Bullard, Anatomy of 
Environmental Racism and the Environmental Justice Movement, in GRASSROOTS, supra note 11, 
at 15–39; C.J. TIMMONS ROBERTS & MELISSA M. TOFFOLON-WEISS, CHRONICLES FROM THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE FRONTLINE 3–28 (2001); Terence J. Centner et al., Environmental 
Justice and Toxic Releases: Establishing Evidence of Discriminatory Effect Based on Race and 
Not Income, 3 WIS. ENVTL. L.J. 119, 120 (1996). 
 33. See Ursic, supra note 27, at 497; see also James H. Colopy, Note, The Road Less 
Traveled: Pursuing Environmental Justice Through Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 
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Protection Clause as a legal vehicle for addressing environmental 
discrimination. 
II.  THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 
A. Brief Overview of Relevant Equal Protection Jurisprudence 
The Fourteenth Amendment specifically empowers the federal government 
to act against discriminatory government actions at the state and local level, 
particularly those made on the basis of race.34  According to the Equal 
Protection Clause, no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”35  “[T]he purpose of the equal protection clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the State’s 
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether 
occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through 
duly constituted agents.”36  The United States Supreme Court has concluded 
that the function of the Equal Protection Clause is to ensure that the 
government treats “all persons similarly situated” the same.37 
An equal protection claim essentially has two elements: (1) the plaintiff 
was treated differently from other similarly situated persons, and (2) this 
different treatment was motivated by one of the following: (a) an intent to 
discriminate on the basis of a characteristic, such as race or religion; (b) an 
intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of a fundamental right guaranteed by the 
Constitution; or (c) a bad faith intent to injure a person.38  In an equal 
protection case, after the plaintiff shows that a facially neutral statute has a 
disproportionate impact on him, he must prove that the governmental decision-
maker responsible for the act causing the adverse impact was motivated by an 
invidious discriminatory purpose.39 
 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 125 (1994); Benford, supra note 19, at 284–289 (advocating the use of Title 
VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (Fair Housing Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631, to combat 
environmental discrimination). 
 34. Comfort ex rel. Neumyer v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 283 F. Supp. 2d 328, 391 (D. Mass. 
2003). 
 35. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Bluitt v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 236 F. Supp. 
2d 703, 734 (S.D. Tex. 2002). 
 36. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (quoting Sioux City Bridge Co. 
v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 445 (1923)). 
 37. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (stating that 
“[t]he Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall ‘deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a 
direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”). 
 38. See Diesel v. Town of Lewisboro, 232 F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting LeClair v. 
Saunders, 627 F.2d 606, 609–10 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
 39. See United States v. Hare, 308 F. Supp. 2d 955, 991 (D. Neb. 2004). 
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The courts have acknowledged intentional discrimination in three contexts.  
First, courts have been willing to find discriminatory intent in those cases 
where a law or policy has expressly categorized citizens on the basis of race.40  
In addition, courts have found discriminatory intent in situations where a 
facially neutral law or policy has been applied differently to citizens because of 
their race.41  Finally, courts have noted that discriminatory intent may exist 
when a facially neutral law or policy, that has been applied evenhandedly, was 
motivated by discriminatory intent and had a racially discriminatory impact.42 
The Supreme Court has structured its equal protection analysis by 
establishing the following three levels of review for challenges to government-
supported actions: rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.43  
“When a legislative enactment has been challenged on equal protection 
grounds, one standard of review is rational basis review, which requires that 
the law be rationally related to a legitimate government interest.”44  The 
rational basis test is the lowest level of review.  Thus, governmental decisions 
analyzed under the rational basis test are almost always upheld.  The rational 
basis test is applied to cases where the challenged activity did not impact a 
person in a protected class or undermine a fundamental right.45 
The Supreme Court has also developed an intermediate level of scrutiny 
that lies “[b]etween [the] extremes of rational basis review and strict 
scrutiny . . . .”46  Typically, the Court applies intermediate scrutiny when it has 
to review laws that impact quasi-suspect classifications such as gender or 
age.47  When a classification affects “suspect classes” of persons or burdens a 
fundamental right, “strict scrutiny” applies and a compelling governmental 
interest must be shown to justify the classification.48Strict scrutiny is such a 
high standard that its application usually results in a victory for the plaintiff.  
The standard is applied whenever a member of a suspect class can prove 
discriminatory intent.49  Therefore, in order to have any level of success, 
 
 40. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 546 (1999). 
 41. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 367–68 (1886). 
 42. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977). 
 43. Goulart v. Meadows, 220 F. Supp. 2d 494, 501 (D. Md. 2002); see also Darren Lenard 
Hutchinson, “Unexplainable on Grounds Other Than Race”: The Inversion of Privilege and 
Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, U. ILL. L. REV. 615, 633–634 (2003). 
 44. Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 174–75 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 45. See id.; Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 1358 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 46. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). 
 47. See United States v. Coleman, 166 F.3d 428, 431 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam); see also 
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
 48. United States v. Extreme Assocs., Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 578, 585 (2005). 
 49. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995). 
[T]he purpose of strict scrutiny is to “smoke out” illegitimate uses of race by assuring that 
[a state actor] is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.  
The test also ensures that the means chosen “fit” this compelling goal so closely that there 
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environmental discrimination plaintiffs must prove that decisions to place 
environmental hazards in their communities were motivated by racial 
considerations.  To meet their burden of proof, those plaintiffs must have 
access to quality information.50 
B. Seminal Equal Protection Cases 
Equal Protection litigation is controlled by two seminal Supreme Court 
decisions: Washington v. Davis,51  and Village of Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.52 
In Davis, Harley and Sellers, two black men, unsuccessfully applied to 
become police officers in Washington, D.C.53  Their applications were rejected 
because they did not pass a written personnel test.54  Harley and Sellers filed a 
lawsuit alleging that the police department’s recruiting procedures, including 
the written personnel test, were racially discriminatory in violation of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.55  Instead of claiming intentional 
discrimination, the plaintiffs contended that the written test bore no 
relationship to job performance and had a discriminatory effect of screening 
out black applicants.56   
The district court made three key conclusions.  The first two conclusions 
the court made were that the number of blacks on the police force was not 
proportionate to the racial content of the city and that more blacks flunked the 
test than white applicants.57  The court also determined that the police 
department did not validate the test to gauge if it was a reliable indicator of job 
performance.58  Nonetheless, the district court refused to find intentional 
discrimination on the part of the police department and granted the 
department’s summary judgment motion.59 
In reaching its decision, the district court was influenced by the fact that 
(1) 44% of the new police recruits were blacks, a percentage that was 
proportionate to the number of blacks on the police force and equal to the 
number of 20- to 29-year-old blacks located in the recruiting area; (2) the 
 
is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial 
prejudice or stereotype. 
Id.  (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)) (emphasis added). 
 50. The value of information will be discussed in a later section. 
 51. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 52. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
 53. Davis, 426 U.S. at 232–33. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 235. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Davis, 426 U.S. at 235. 
 59. Id. 
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police department had affirmatively recruited blacks and had many pass the 
test, but then fail to report for duty; and (3) the test was a useful indicator of 
training school performance and was not designed to, and did not, discriminate 
against otherwise qualified blacks.60 
In an opinion written by Justice White, the United States Supreme Court 
affirmed the district court’s verdict because it concluded that the written test 
was facially neutral.61  The Court decided that the disproportionate impact of 
the test on black applicants did not necessitate a finding that the test was a 
purposely discriminatory device.62  In order to justify its decision, the Court 
asserted that a governmental action is not unconstitutional just because it has a 
disparate impact upon the members of a minority group.63  The Court reasoned 
that “[d]isproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole 
touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the 
Constitution.”64 
Since Davis, it has been understood that a facially neutral governmental 
action may be constitutionally valid even if it disproportionally impacts racial 
minorities.  However, if the evidence shows that an “invidious discriminatory 
purpose” was a motivating factor behind the action, the government has the 
burden of proving that the action was taken using racially neutral selection 
criteria and procedures.65  Therefore, in order to prove that the law or 
government action violates the Equal Protection Clause, a person must trace 
the disparate impact to a discriminatory purpose.66 
In light of the Davis decision, to be successful, environmental 
discrimination plaintiffs must show that the placement of the environmental 
hazard in their community was motivated by intentional discrimination.  A 
person who seeks recovery under a theory of purposeful discrimination must 
demonstrate that the governmental authority implemented the facially neutral 
policy being challenged “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse 
effects upon an identifiable group.”67  After Davis, it was clear that in order to 
bring a successful equal protection case the plaintiff had to prove that the 
government decision-maker was motivated by discriminatory intent.68  A few 
years later, the United States Supreme Court used a case involving a denial of a 
rezoning request to build low- and moderate-income housing to elaborate upon 
 
 60. Id. at 235–36. 
 61. Id. at 246. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Davis, 246 U.S. at 242. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 241–42. 
 66. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 353 F.3d 1287, 1310 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 67. Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 562 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting 
Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)). 
 68. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239. 
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its Davis decision.69  In an opinion written by Justice Powell, the Court 
concluded that if a discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor behind a 
challenged activity, it may be shown by the introduction of circumstantial 
rather than direct evidence.70 
In Village of Arlington Heights, the Supreme Court suggested the 
following relevant factors to use as evidentiary sources: (1) the level of impact 
the governmental decision has on different races (whether the action bears 
more heavily on one race than the other);71  (2) the historical background of the 
decision (whether there was a series of governmental actions taken for 
invidious purposes);72 (3) the sequence of events occurring prior to the 
challenged action (whether there were departures, substantive or procedural, 
from the normal decision-making process);73 and (4) the legislative or 
administrative history of the challenged activity (whether a review of the 
contemporary statements made by the decision-makers, the minutes of the 
meetings regarding the challenged decision, or the reports pertaining to the 
challenged decision indicate any type of unfair purpose).74  In addition to the 
above-mentioned factors, the foreseeability of the adverse consequences may 
have some bearing on the existence of discriminatory intent.75 
If a facially neutral law is administered in a way that reveals an 
overwhelming pattern of discrimination, the pattern of discrimination itself 
may be enough for the court to infer discriminatory intent.  This is especially 
true in cases where a pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, 
emerges from the challenged governmental action.76  Courts have emphasized 
that “[e]specially strong statistical proof may be sufficient to draw an inference 
of discriminatory intent . . . .”77 
For example, in some cases, the governmental entity has engaged in a 
pattern of discrimination so blatant that the Court has found discriminatory 
purpose based solely on the pattern.  This proposition is illustrated by the legal 
 
 69. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
 70. Id. at 266–67. 
 71. Id. at 266. 
 72. Id. at 267. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Arlington Heights, 492 U.S. at 268. 
 75. See Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 n.25 (1979).  In addressing 
the foreseeability aspect of discriminatory intent, the Court stated that discriminatory intent 
“implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences.  It implies that the 
decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ 
not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”  Id. at 279 (citation 
omitted); see also Rachel D. Godsil, Note, Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 
394, 409–10 (1991). 
 76. See Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 360–61 (1970); see also Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 
404, 407–08 (1967). 
 77. Anderson v. Cornejo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1050 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
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analysis in Yick Wo v. Hopkins.78  In that case, a city ordinance prohibited 
laundries from operating in wooden buildings without the consent of the city’s 
board of supervisors.79  At that time, there were approximately 320 laundries in 
the city and county of San Francisco; 310 of those laundries were constructed 
of wood.80  Chinese residents owned 240 of the 320 laundries.81  The Chinese 
residents unsuccessfully petitioned the city’s board of supervisors for 
permission to continue operating their wooden laundries.82  Nonetheless, all of 
the white residents (except for one woman) who requested permission to 
continue operating their wooden laundries were granted exemptions from the 
ordinance.83 
The Court stated: “The fact that the right to give consent is reserved in the 
ordinance shows that carrying on the laundry business in wooden buildings is 
not deemed of itself necessarily dangerous.”84  Based upon that observation, 
the Court concluded that the purpose of the ordinance was either to close most 
of the Chinese laundries or to drive the Chinese out of the city and county of 
San Francisco.85  According to the Court, although the law was facially neutral, 
the public authority applied it with “an evil eye and an unequal hand.”86  
Therefore, the Court held that the ordinance was unconstitutional based on the 
city’s discriminatory application of its mandates.87 
Another case decided on the basis of statistics was Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot.88  Gomillion involved an evaluation of the validity of Local Act No. 
140.  That law, which was passed by the Alabama Legislature, redefined the 
boundaries of the City of Tuskegee.89  Prior to the passage of the statute, the 
city was square in shape, but as a result of the statute’s mandates the shape of 
the city was changed into a strangely irregular twenty-eight-sided figure.90  
The ultimate impact of the law was to remove all except four or five of the 
black citizens from the city.91  On the contrary, not a single white resident was 
 
 78. 118 U.S. 356 (1886); see also David Crump, Evidence, Race, Intent, and Evil: The 
Paradox of Purposelessness in the Constitutional Racial Discrimination Cases, 27 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 285, 289–291 (1998). 
 79. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 358. 
 80. Id. at 359. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 359. 
 84. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 361. 
 85. Id. at 363. 
 86. Id. at 373–74. 
 87. Id. at 363. 
 88. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
 89. Id. at 340. 
 90. Id. at 341. 
 91. Id. 
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removed from the city.92  Therefore, the result of the Act was to deprive blacks 
of the benefits of living in the city, including the right to vote in city 
elections.93 
After the passage of the statute, a group of black city residents filed an 
action claiming that the statute was unconstitutional because it violated the 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the Constitution.94  The district court granted the city’s motion for dismissal 
because it concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter and the 
complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.95  The 
United States Supreme Court held that the law was probably unconstitutional, 
so the petitioners were entitled to prove their allegations at trial.96  In reaching 
its decision, the Supreme Court reasoned that the act did not appear to be an 
ordinary geographic redistricting measure.  Instead, the Supreme Court noted 
that it would be easy to conclude that the law was “tantamount . . . to a 
mathematical demonstration, that the legislation is solely concerned with 
segregating white and colored voters by fencing Negro citizens out of town so 
as to deprive them of their pre-existing municipal vote.”97 
Cases like the ones discussed above are rare and have been nonexistent in 
the environmental discrimination context.  As a result, the establishment of 
intent as the standard for proving discrimination has placed an onerous burden 
on plaintiffs.  In order to be successful, these plaintiffs have to introduce 
evidence showing that the governmental action was clearly motivated by 
discriminatory considerations.  A central reason why plaintiffs in 
environmental discrimination cases have been unable to meet their burden of 
proof is the lack of access to quality information.  As the results of the 
environmental discrimination cases discussed in the next section indicate, 
information is a vital component of putting forth a successful case. 
III.  CURRENT APPLICATION OF THE INTENT STANDARD IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
DISCRIMINATION CASES 
The following three cases illustrate how the Equal Protection doctrine has 
been interpreted in cases involving the placement of environmentally 
hazardous facilities in predominately minority communities.  In each case, the 
court rejected the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim, citing an absence of clear 
evidence of discriminatory intent on the part of the decision-maker.  Even 
though the evidence of disparate impact was clear and acknowledged by some 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 341. 
 94. Id. at 340. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 347–48. 
 97. Id. at 341. 
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of the courts, the courts’ adherence to the intent requirement prevented the 
plaintiffs from prevailing.98  In each case, the plaintiffs’ inability to prove 
purposeful and conscious intent to discriminate on the part of the decision-
maker prevented them from winning their Equal Protection challenge. 
A. Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp.99 
In Bean, the plaintiffs sued to contest the Texas Department of Health’s 
decision to grant a permit to Southwestern Waste Management to place a solid 
waste facility in the East Houston-Dyersdale Road area in Harris County.100  
The plaintiffs claimed that the decision was motivated by racial discrimination 
because the city had a history of placing solid waste sites in black 
neighborhoods.101 
The plaintiffs relied upon statistical data to show a pattern of racial 
discrimination in the state agency’s placement of solid waste sites in minority 
communities.102  The first set of data supplied by the plaintiffs dealt with the 
two solid wastes sites that the City of Houston planned to use.103  The plaintiffs 
contended that the selection of those two sites was discriminatory because the 
area contained 100% of the type-one landfills used by the City of Houston, and 
only 6.9% of the entire population of the city.104  The Court found that 
argument unpersuasive for two reasons.  First, the Court reasoned that, because 
only two sites were involved, the data was statistically insignificant.105  
Second, the Court determined that, of the two proposed sites, one was in a 
primarily white census tract and the other was in a primarily minority census 
tract.106  Therefore, race was probably not a consideration when the city chose 
the two sites.107 
The second set of data the plaintiffs submitted focused on the total number 
of solid waste sites located in the proposed target area.108  The plaintiffs noted 
that the target area contained 15% of the city’s solid waste sites, but only 6.9% 
of its population.109  The plaintiffs argued that most of the solid waste sites 
 
 98. See Brian Faerstein, Comment, Resurrecting Equal Protection Challenges to 
Environmental Inequity: A Deliberately Indifferent Optimistic Approach, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
561, 566–569 (2004) (discussing cases where the plaintiffs attempted to use the Equal Protection 
Clause to challenge industrial siting decisions). 
 99. 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979). 
 100. Id. at 674–75. 
 101. Id. at 675. 
 102. Id. at 678. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 678. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 678. 
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were placed in that area because it had a 70% minority population.110  The 
court decided that the placement of so many solid waste sites in the target area 
had nothing to do with race because it was reasonable to place the sites in an 
area that was sparsely populated.111  In addition, the court concluded that race 
was not a factor in the placement of the sites because half of the sites in the 
target area were in census tracts with more than a 70% white population.112 
The third set of data put forth by the plaintiffs considered the city as a 
whole.  The data showed that only 32.4% of the sites were located in the 
western half of the city where 73.4% of the whites lived.113  In addition, 
according to the data, 67.6% of the sites were located in the eastern half of the 
city where 61.6% of the minority population resided.114  The court disagreed 
with the plaintiffs’ interpretation of the data.  After analyzing the data relying 
on census tracts instead of halves or quadrants of the city, the court stated that 
“[t]he difference between the racial composition of census tracts in general and 
the racial composition of census tracts with solid waste sites is . . . only 
0.3%.”115  The court found that small difference to be statistically 
insignificant.116 
After evaluating all of the statistical evidence, the court rejected the 
plaintiff’s argument and held that, although the siting decision appeared to be 
“unfortunate and insensitive” the plaintiffs had not proven that the state 
officials had a discriminatory intent.117  The court pointed out several 
weaknesses in the plaintiffs’ evidence.  Regarding the statistical data, the court 
indicated that neighborhood data, as opposed to census tract data, would have 
been more forceful if the plaintiffs had shown that sites located in 
predominately white census tracts were in minority neighborhoods.118  
Moreover, the court found that the non-statistical data was inadequate to show 
discriminatory intent.119  The court stated that, in its opinion, there were too 
many unanswered questions, including how sites were selected and what 
factors were used in the placement of the sites.120 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 678. 
 115. Id. at 679. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 680. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 679–80. 
 120. Id. at 680. 
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B. East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass’n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & 
Zoning Commission121 
The minority plaintiffs in East Bibb sought to reverse a decision by the 
local planning board to locate a landfill in a predominately black 
community.122  In the case, Mullis Tree Service, Inc. and Robert Mullis applied 
to the Commission for a conditional use permit to operate a non-putrescible 
waste landfill in a census tract containing 5,527 people.123  Of these residents, 
3,367 were black and 2,149 were white.124  The Commission initially voted to 
deny the application.125  However, after rehearing the matter, the Commission 
approved the final site plan for the landfill and issued a conditional use permit 
to Mullis.126 
Analyzing the permit decision, the court applied the Arlington Heights 
five-part test to determine whether the plaintiffs’ evidence supported a finding 
of discriminatory intent.127  After reviewing all of the evidence, the court 
concluded that the Commission’s decision to approve the conditional use 
permit was not motivated by the intent to discriminate against blacks.128  The 
court noted that, since the census tract contained a majority black population, 
the decision to approve the placement of the landfill in that area had a greater 
impact on blacks than it did on whites.129  Therefore, the court conceded that 
there was glaring evidence of disparate impact.130  Nevertheless, according to 
the court, there were “no specific antecedent events which support a 
determination that race was a motivating factor in the Commission’s 
decision.”131  In making that determination, the court emphasized that the only 
other Commission-approved landfill was located in a predominately white 
census tract.132 
The court’s opinion did offer environmental discrimination plaintiffs some 
guidance.  The trial judge noted that the local Commission could not “actively 
solicit this or any other landfill application,”133 and the opinion hinted that 
sudden changes in zoning or relaxations in procedure would be considered 
 
 121. 706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga. 1989). 
 122. Id. at 881. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 882. 
 126. East Bibb, 706 F. Supp. at 883. 
 127. Id. at 884. 
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 133. Id. at 885. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2006] CHANGING THE BATHWATER AND KEEPING THE BABY 487 
highly suspect.134  The court determined that evidence of past discriminatory 
decisions by agencies other than the county planning commission was 
irrelevant to the discrimination issue it was considering.135  Therefore, courts 
may refuse to consider the general state or city history of racism and 
segregation.  However, the court did not rule out the possibility of considering 
past decisions by the Commission that had resulted in a disparate impact on the 
minority community.136 
C. R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay137 
In R.I.S.E., a bi-racial citizen group challenged the decision of the local 
county board to site a landfill in a predominately black community in 
Virginia.138  Since the landfills in King and Queen County did not meet the 
state’s new environmental standards, the Board of Supervisors negotiated with 
the Chesapeake Corporation for a joint venture landfill.139  During the summer 
of 1988, after Chesapeake abandoned the negotiations, the board decided to 
purchase property from Chesapeake to use as a landfill site.140  Chesapeake 
offered the board the choice of buying either the Piedmont Tract or the 
Norman-Saunders Tract.141  The board selected the Piedmont Tract because 
tests showed that it was suitable for use as a landfill.142  After several public 
hearings, members of the Board unanimously voted to buy the Piedmont Tract 
for use as a landfill.143 
The members of the community where the proposed landfill was to be 
located opposed the project.144  To hear the concerns of the residents, several 
board members attended a meeting organized by Reverend Taylor, pastor of 
Second Mt. Olive Baptist Church.145  The persons objecting to the project were 
worried that if the landfill was placed in their neighborhood (1) their quality of 
life would be diminished; (2) their property values would be lowered; (3) their 
worship and social functions at Second Mt. Olive Baptist Church would be 
disrupted; (4) the grave sites on the church grounds would be damaged; (5) 
 
 134. Id. at 886. 
 135. Id. at 885. 
 136. East Bibb, 706 F. Supp. at 885. 
 137. 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991). 
 138. Id. at 1148. 
 139. Id. at 1146. 
 140. Id. at 1147. 
 141. Id. at 1146. 
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local access roads would have to be improved; and (6) the historic church146 
and community would be harmed.147 
In light of the fact that the three other landfills in the area were all in 
neighborhoods that were at least ninety-five percent black and that the county 
had previously refused to site a landfill in a predominately white 
neighborhood, the court acknowledged that the landfill had a disproportionate 
impact upon the black community.148  Nonetheless, the court concluded that 
the plaintiffs had not satisfied the remainder of the discriminatory purpose 
equation and rejected the Equal Protection claim.149 
The court was influenced by the board’s need to decide quickly on a 
location for the landfill.150  The board’s prior attempt to buy landfill space had 
been unsuccessful.151  Because the Piedmont Tract had been found 
environmentally suitable for the purpose of the landfill development, instead of 
looking at other possible locations, the board took immediate steps to acquire 
the property.152  Moreover, the court seemed to give some weight to the fact 
that the board making the siting decision contained three white members and 
two black members.153  Further, the court appeared to suspect R.I.S.E.’s 
motives in bringing a discrimination action to challenge the siting decision.  
The court stated that “[r]ace discrimination did not become a significant public 
issue until it appeared that the initial thrust was failing.”154  The court’s 
skepticism was probably based upon the fact that R.I.S.E. recommended a 
replacement site that was located in a predominately black area.155 
D. Components of a Successful Environmental Discrimination Case 
The intent requirement has been a major stumbling block for 
environmental discrimination plaintiffs seeking relief under the Equal 
Protection Clause.156  Nonetheless, the courts have acknowledged that if the 
plaintiffs present the correct type of circumstantial evidence, they can prevail 
using the Equal Protection Clause.  The courts have given no indication that 
they will substitute the intent requirement for a lesser standard.157  In order to 
 
 146. In 1869, freed slaves built the Second Mt. Olive Baptist Church.  Id. 
 147. R.I.S.E., 768 F. Supp. at 1147. 
 148. Id. at 1148–49. 
 149. Id. at 1149. 
 150. Id. at 1150. 
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 152. R.I.S.E., 768 F. Supp. at 1150. 
 153. See id. at 1146. 
 154. Id. at 1148. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing “Environmental Justice”: The Distributional Effects of 
Environmental Protection, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 787, 829–33 (1993). 
 157. Cox v. City of Jackson, 343 F. Supp. 2d 546, 570 (S.D. Miss. 2004). 
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meet the burden of proof, under the current system, plaintiffs must have access 
to information.  Therefore, persons fighting environmental discrimination 
should take steps to gather the information necessary to prove discriminatory 
intent. 
In light of the case precedent, this section is an attempt to demonstrate the 
important role that information plays in preparing a successful equal protection 
action in the environmental discrimination context.  The starting point in 
preparing an Equal Protection case is still the Arlington Heights factors.158  
Therefore, the focus of the discussion is upon the criteria established by that 
case.  A multi-factor approach similar to the one adopted here has been taken 
by others.159 The factors dealing with events leading up to the decision and the 
legislative and administrative history of the decisions are combined. 
1. Disparate Impact 
The first thing an environmental discrimination plaintiff needs to establish 
is the existence of racially disparate impact.160  In order to be successful, it is 
important for the plaintiff to have good statistical data.  According to Bradford 
Mank, the selection of the population sample for comparison impacts the 
disparate impact analysis.  Mank further asserts that, in order to prove 
disparate impact, the plaintiff must compare the demographics of those in the 
adversely affected area with others in the area who are not impacted by the 
decision.161  The effort and expense involved in gathering data often leads 
plaintiffs to conduct their analyses using “pre-ordained units of [population] 
comparison, such as census tracts or zip codes.”162  Census data is often used 
because it is readily available in paper and computerized forms.163  The EPA 
suggests the use of census data to classify the population in the affected area 
with regards to race, ethnicity, economic, and educational demographics.164  
However, the agency cautions that census data may not be accurate in some 
 
 158. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–68 (1977). 
 159. See e.g., Alice Kaswan, Environmental Law: Grist For The Equal Protection Mill, 70 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 387, 411-426 (1999).). 
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 162. Id. at 410; see also EPA GUIDANCE, supra note 9, at § 2.1.2 (stating that data obtained 
from the census is one of the most common types of information used to determine the minority 
status of a community). 
 163. The EPA opines that the availability of census demographic information in digitized 
format can be helpful when analyzing environmental justice issues.  EPA GUIDANCE, supra note 
9, at § 5.1. 
 164. Id. 
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cases.165  One possible cause of this deficiency is the fact that census data is 
the result of self-reporting.166 
In most instances, such as in the Bean case, this type of analysis presents 
problems.167  In that case, the court reasoned that the plaintiffs’ case might 
have been stronger if they had submitted neighborhood data as opposed to 
census tract data.168  The census tract data presented did not provide a true 
picture of the community affected by the proposed landfill.  In justifying its 
decision not to find a discriminatory purpose, the court noted that the county’s 
other landfill was located in a predominately white census tract.169 
In order to obtain better information to submit to the court about the 
composition of the community, the plaintiffs should use other methods.  For 
instance, they may be able to get information from local resources by asking 
questions, conducting interviews, and doing research.170  Additionally, the 
plaintiffs can use a geographic information system (GIS)171 or a similar 
mapping system to identify the location and percentage of the minority persons 
in the community.172  The EPA has acknowledged that maps, aerial 
photographs, and GIS can be used to discover geographic areas where possible 
environmental justice concerns subsist.173 
It appears that the plaintiffs will have a better claim if they are able to 
show, for example, that the area immediately surrounding the proposed facility 
is composed almost exclusively of minority residents and that the population 
becomes whiter as the distance from the facility increases.  Hence, in order to 
obtain the most useful data, environmental discrimination plaintiffs should use 
an analytic method that analyzes demographics in terms of proximity to the 
proposed hazard.174 
The effects of an environmental hazard frequently occur in inverse 
proportion to the distance from the location or site of the hazard.175  For 
 
 165. See id. at § 2.1.2.  “[I]t may be necessary for the EPA NEPA analyst to validate [census] 
information with the use of additional sources.”  Id.  “The additional methods . . . include 
contacting local resources, government agencies, commercial database firms, and the use of 
locational/distributional tools.”  Id. 
 166. Id. at § 5.1. 
 167. Bean v. Sw. Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 677 (S.D. Tex. 1979). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 678. 
 170. See generally EPA GUIDANCE, supra note 9, at §§ 2.1.2, 5.1. 
 171. GIS systems are geographic references or computerized atlases.  See id. at § 5.1. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See Richard D. Gragg, III et al., The Location and Community Demographics of 
Targeted Environmental Hazardous Sites in Florida, 12 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 12–14 
(1996) (describing a study conducted in fifteen Florida counties). 
 175. See Julia B. Latham Worsham, Disparate Impact Lawsuits Under Title VI, Section 602: 
Can a Legal Tool Build Environmental Justice?, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 631, 649 (2000) 
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example, the closer the minority population is to the hazard, the greater the 
likelihood that those persons will be adversely impacted.  Thus, proximity to 
the environmental hazard usually correlates with the probability that the 
minority population will be disproportionately affected by the location of the 
hazard.176  As a consequence, if environmental discrimination advocates can 
show that minority persons in the community live nearest to the environmental 
hazard, they may have a better chance of proving disparate impact.  
Commentators have suggested the use of “maps, aerial photographs, and 
information databases” in order to identify the communities that are within 
close proximity of the proposed project.177 
2. Historical Background 
In Arlington Heights, the Supreme Court suggested that courts look to the 
role of historical discrimination to determine discriminatory intent.178  The 
court in East Bibb, however, stated that it would only consider relevant 
discrimination perpetrated by the particular government agency that made the 
decision being challenged by the plaintiffs.179  In the context of hazardous 
waste sitings, the agencies are usually newly created, so they may have no 
history of discrimination.  Therefore, environmental discrimination plaintiffs 
will be at a substantial disadvantage when trying to gather the information 
necessary to prove discriminatory intent. 
Furthermore, it appears that the court’s focus may be even narrower than 
the actions of the agency involved in the case.  For instance, in R.I.S.E., while 
analyzing the past siting decisions of the board, the court pointed out which 
present board members had been involved in making those decisions.180  
Consequently, it is possible that the plaintiffs could prove discriminatory intent 
in past siting decisions by the agency at issue, and still fail, if the current 
members were not a part of the agency at the time those siting decisions were 
made. 
 
(citing EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE FOR INVESTIGATING TITLE VI ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS 
CHALLENGING PERMITS (1998), and stating that the identity of the population affected is 
“generally determined by proximity to the facility”). 
 176. Gragg et al., supra note 174, at 16–17. 
 177. Cheryl A. Calloway & Karen L. Ferguson, The “Human Environment” Requirement of 
the National Environmental Policy Act: Implications for Environmental Justice, 1997 DETROIT C. 
L. MICH. ST. L. REV. 1147, 1165 (1997); see also EPA GUIDANCE, supra note 9, at § 5.1.  Local 
maps and aerial photographs may give a “snap shot,” or big picture of where low-income and 
minority persons are located in the area and their proximity to the proposed project.  Id.  They 
may also be used to identify important natural resources that may be affected by the proposed 
project.  Id. 
 178. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1976). 
 179. East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass’n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning 
Comm’n, 706 F. Supp. 880, 885 (M.D. Ga. 1989). 
 180. R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1148 (E.D. Va. 1991). 
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One potential solution to the problem is for the plaintiffs to have 
background checks conducted on the individual agency members to determine 
their attitudes toward racial minorities.  This information may also be gained 
by searching old newspapers.181  Another potential source of this type of 
information is minutes from agency meetings or pubic hearings.  If the 
plaintiffs are able to discover insensitive remarks the members have made in 
their public and/or private capacity, they may be able to convince the court that 
the remarks are relevant to show that racial discrimination affected the 
agency’s decision-making process.  In addition, the plaintiffs may strengthen 
their case if they can show that an agency member’s past behavior indicates 
that he or she has a tendency to disregard the concerns of the minority 
community (e.g., associating with a business venture that exploits minorities). 
The racial composition of the decision-making body may also come into 
play under this factor.  This seemed to carry some weight in R.I.S.E.  In that 
case, when finding no discriminatory purpose, the court emphasized that the 
board making the decision contained two black members.182  The court’s 
reliance on that fact to support its finding of no discriminatory purpose is 
flawed for two reasons.  First, the court did not consider the fact that the black 
members on the board were out-numbered three to two.183  Thus, even if both 
black members had voted against the siting decision, the permit probably 
would have still been approved.  Second, the court’s reasoning presupposes 
that blacks are not capable of intentionally discriminating against other blacks.  
It is entirely possible for an all minority decision-making body to intentionally 
discriminate against a predominantly minority community.184  In addition, the 
court noted that the two black members were elected to the board in a special 
election, after the federal government ordered a redistricting.185  The fact that 
the election was ordered should have indicated to the court that some type of 
racial tension might have existed in the county. 
 
 181. See East Bibb, 706 F. Supp. at 885.  The court was willing to read newspaper articles to 
get historical background on decision-makers.  Id. 
 182. R.I.S.E., 768 F. Supp. at 1146 (noting the racial composition of the board). 
 183. See id. 
 184. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 503 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring).  Justice 
Marshall stated: 
Social scientists agree that members of minority groups frequently respond to 
discrimination and prejudice by attempting to disassociate themselves from the group, 
even to the point of adopting the majority’s negative attitudes towards the minority.  Such 
behavior occurs with particular frequency among members of minority groups who have 
achieved some measure of economic or political success and thereby have gained some 
acceptability among the dominant group. 
Id. 
 185. R.I.S.E., 768 F. Supp. at 1146. 
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3. Departures from Procedure 
The East Bibb plaintiffs argued that the Commission had deviated from its 
normal procedures in several ways: the Commission urged participation from 
the city and county, it granted a rehearing after the petition for a landfill was 
denied, and it made certain findings of fact.186  The court acknowledged that 
the Commission had departed somewhat from the norm, but did not identify 
any procedural flaws.187  However, the court did analyze the reasons behind 
the procedural changes and indicated that sudden changes in procedure would 
be given a hard look.188 
Therefore, environmental discrimination plaintiffs should gather 
information to familiarize themselves with the agency’s decision-making 
procedures by attending meetings dealing with the placement of environmental 
hazards, reading the agency’s regulations or bylaws, and looking through 
minutes of agency meetings.  To support their assertions, the plaintiffs need to 
present evidence that the decision-making body deviated from its normal 
practices when it decided to approve the placement of an environmental hazard 
in their community.  This will shift the burden to the agency to justify its 
actions.  Moreover, if the agency has no independent siting criteria, the 
plaintiff should point that out to the court.  The lack of objective criteria for 
making placement decisions may indicate that the decision-makers were 
subjective in the selection process.  As a result, the courts may be more willing 
to find discriminatory intent. 
4. Events Prior to the Decision 
The court may be willing to infer discriminatory intent from relevant 
actions that occurred before the agency decided to place the environmental 
hazard in a minority neighborhood.  For example, in Bean, the court stated that 
it would have been helpful to know the initial reason the chosen site was 
selected for consideration.189  In addition, the East Bibb court opined that it 
would not be proper for the decision-making agency to actively solicit an 
application to place a site in a certain neighborhood.190  Hence, the 
environmental discrimination plaintiff should do discovery as soon as possible 
to try to find information about the selection process.191  If plaintiffs are able to 
prove that the selection of the minority neighborhood was anything but 
 
 186. East Bibb, 706 F. Supp. at 886. 
 187. Id. 
 188. See id. 
 189. Bean v. Sw. Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673,  680 (S.D. Tex. 1979). 
 190. East Bibb, 706 F. Supp. at 885. 
 191. See Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 680 (noting that extensive discovery was not conducted in this 
case). 
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random, the court may be more willing to question the motives of the decision-
makers. 
The plaintiff should also try to show that at the time the site was 
considered the agency members knew that the disparate impact would occur 
because they were aware that the affected community was already substantially 
burdened by environmental hazards.  It must be noted, however, that in 
response to that argument, the court in Bean stated that a sample of two sites 
was not a sufficient database to create a statistically significant result.192  To 
avoid that problem, the plaintiffs should focus on other types of environmental 
hazards in addition to the type at issue.  For instance, the affected 
neighborhood may already have major highways running through it, an airport 
nearby, and several industrial plants located within it.  Recognizing that the 
agency knew that the affected neighborhood already contained these hazards 
before it made its siting decision may make the court view the decision more 
critically. 
Another factor that the court considered relevant in East Bibb was the fact 
that the county had previously refused to site the landfill at the approved site, 
and it had apparently not considered siting the landfill in a predominately 
white neighborhood.193  Consequently, the plaintiffs may have a strong case for 
discriminatory intent if they are able to show that the siting agency did not 
consider any suitable predominately white neighborhoods as a potential 
location for the environmental hazard. 
5. Other Considerations 
The formula for proving intent in an environmental discrimination case 
comes down to the plaintiffs obtaining good information, including statistical 
and scientific data, by conducting thorough discovery and utilizing other 
investigative techniques.  The need for presenting good statistical data has 
been addressed in the previous section.  Thus, the focus of this section is on the 
need for good science. 
Good scientific testing will enable the plaintiffs to determine if the 
proposed site is environmentally suitable for the proposed use.  It will also 
allow the plaintiffs to discover if there are other locations in non-minority 
neighborhoods that could accommodate the proposed project.  Additionally, 
the plaintiffs will take a big step toward proving a discriminatory purpose if 
they find a site in the area that is almost identical, but for racial composition, to 
the one selected.  Having the scientific expertise will assist the plaintiffs in 
suggesting alternative sites.  If the plaintiffs in R.I.S.E. had availed themselves 
of scientific technology, they might have been able to convince the board to 
locate the site in another suitable location.  The alternative sites recommended 
 
 192. Id. 
 193. 706 F. Supp. at 884–85. 
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by the plaintiffs in R.I.S.E. were determined to be “environmentally unsuitable 
because of the slope of the land and the existence of a stream running through 
its center.”194 
In the environmental discrimination area, the courts have made it clear that 
the placement of an environmental hazard in a minority community would be a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause if the plaintiffs showed a disparate 
impact and proved that the placement decision was made with a discriminatory 
intent.  Thus, the earlier the plaintiffs get involved in the siting process the 
better chance they will have to compile the significant amount of information 
necessary to use as circumstantial evidence to build a winning Equal Protection 
case. 
IV.  THE DEBATE OVER THE VALIDITY OF THE INTENT REQUIREMENT 
After showing a disparate impact, in order to convince the court to apply 
strict scrutiny195 to a governmental action, the plaintiff has to prove that the 
action was motivated by a desire to discriminate against the plaintiff because 
of his race.196  In the environmental discrimination context, this means that the 
plaintiff has to prove that the governmental actor decided to allow the 
environmental hazard to be located in the plaintiff’s community because of the 
race of the residents.  Once the plaintiff meets his or her burden of proof, the 
burden shifts to the governmental actor to justify the government’s decision.197  
The first step the governmental actor must take to survive strict scrutiny is to 
“articulate a legislative goal that is properly considered a compelling 
government interest.”198  Then, the government must show that the decision it 
made or action it took was narrowly drawn to achieve that compelling 
governmental interest.199 
Proponents have continued to embrace the justifications that the 
Washington v. Davis Court used when advancing the discriminatory intent 
 
 194. R.I.S.E., Inc., v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1148 (E.D. Va. 1991). 
 195. “To survive strict scrutiny, an ordinance must be justified by compelling governmental 
interests and employ the least restrictive means to effectuate those interests.”  Deida v. City of 
Milwaukee, 176 F. Supp. 2d 859, 864 (E.D. Wis. 2001). 
 196. Johnson v. California, 336 F.3d 1117, 1117–18 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 197. See Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minnesota Dep’t. of Transp., 345 F.3d 964, 969 (8th Cir. 
2003); Johnson v. Mortham, 915 F. Supp. 1574, 1576 (N.D. Fla. 1996). 
 198. Sherbrooke Turf, 345 F.3d at 969 (8th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Barre, 313 F. 
Supp. 2d 1086, 1090 (D. Colo. 2004), rev’d, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1173 (2004).  “The question is not 
whether the government has a compelling interest in generally enacting the law.  The inquiry 
under equal protection is whether there is a compelling interest for the classification created by 
the law.”  Barre, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 1090. 
 199. Mortham, 915 F. Supp. at 1576; see also Florida A.G.C. Council, Inc. v. Florida, 303 F. 
Supp. 2d 1307, 1314 (N.D. Fla. 2004). 
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requirement.200  According to the Justices in the Davis case, one explanation 
for requiring equal protection plaintiffs to prove discriminatory intent is the 
need for judicial economy.201  The Court opined that, if the plaintiffs only had 
to prove disproportionate impact, the level of governmental action that would 
be subject to strict judicial scrutiny would increase.202  As a consequence, 
legitimate legislative decision-making would be adversely impacted and the 
validity of governmental actions, including tax, welfare, public service, 
regulatory, and licensing statutes would be in doubt.203 
In his article, Professor Charles R. Lawrence III puts forth several other 
possible justifications for the Davis intent requirement.204  One justification 
Professor Lawrence states in his article can be characterized as judicial 
fairness.  He states that the Court determined that it would be unfair for the 
judiciary to impose penalties on innocent persons in order to remedy harms 
that they did not intentionally cause.205  In addition, Professor Lawrence 
contends that the Davis Justices’ adoption of the discriminatory intent 
requirement may be defended on the basis of judicial consistency.206  Making 
the standard disproportionate impact, as opposed to discriminatory intent, 
would be inconsistent with traditional equal protection values because, in order 
to resolve the issue, the judicial decision-maker would have to focus upon the 
race of the plaintiffs.207  Finally, Lawrence seems to indicate that the Davis 
Justices’ decision to require discriminatory intent may be explained on the 
basis of judicial responsibility.208  It may be argued that it would be improper 
for the courts to adversely impact legitimate social interests in an attempt to 
remedy the racially disproportionate impact of facially neutral government 
actions.209 
The persons who disagree with the discriminatory intent requirement have 
consistently stated several main reasons for their opposition.  One reason put 
forth by those persons is that the discriminatory intent requirement places an 
arduous and unfair burden of proof on the plaintiff.210  The time and expense 
 
 200. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 320 (1987). 
 201. See id. at 383. 
 202. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). 
 203. Id. at 248 (citing Frank I. Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and 
Empirical Analysis, 60 CAL. L. REV. 275, 300 (1972)). 
 204. Lawrence, supra note 200, at 320. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 320–21. 
 209. Lawrence, supra note 200, at 320–21. 
 210. See Musa Keenheel, The Need for New Legislation and Liberalization of Current Laws 
to Combat Environmental Racism, 20 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 105, 119 (2001) (stating that 
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necessary to determine the motive of a governmental actor can be prohibitive, 
especially since prospective plaintiffs are frequently low-income people and 
minorities who often do not have the money to hire an attorney or expert 
witnesses.211  As a consequence, very few plaintiffs are able to get the courts to 
recognize and resolve incidents of racial discrimination.212 
There are also practical things that make it difficult for plaintiffs to obtain 
the information necessary to prove that the governmental actor has acted with a 
discriminatory purpose.  For example, the task of discovering the intent of the 
governmental actor will be easier if there is a detailed record of the steps the 
governmental actor took to reach the challenged decision.  The decision to 
permit the placement of environmental hazards is usually made at the local 
level, and local governmental agencies often do not maintain detailed 
records.213  Therefore, there is not usually a “smoking gun” for the 
environmental discrimination plaintiff to find.214 
Opponents also allege that the discriminatory intent constraint ignores 
three important realities.  First, since a person can unconsciously be motivated 
by racism, the governmental actor may not be aware that his decision is based 
upon racist beliefs.215  Specifically, Professor Lawrence argues that 
[t]raditional notions of intent do not reflect the fact that decisions about racial 
matters are influenced in large part by factors that can be characterized as 
neither intentional—in the sense that certain outcomes are self-consciously 
sought—nor unintentional—in the sense that the outcomes are random, 
fortuitous, and uninfluenced by the decisionmaker’s beliefs, desires, and 
wishes.216 
 
“proving discriminatory intent has been the albatross around the necks of minority plaintiffs 
seeking relief from instances of environmental racism”). 
 211. Robert Nelson, To Infer or Not to Infer a Discriminatory Purpose: Rethinking Equal 
Protection Doctrine, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 334, 344 (1986); see also Godsil, supra note 75, at 410; 
Leslie Ann Coleman, It’s the Thought That Counts: The Intent Requirement in Environmental 
Racism Claims, 25 ST. MARY’S L. J. 447, 473–74 (1993). 
 212. Lawrence, supra note 200, at 324; see also Donna Gareis-Smith, Environmental Racism: 
The Failure of Equal Protection to Provide a Judicial Remedy and the Potential of Title VI of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act, 13 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 57, 67 (1994). 
 213. Edward Patrick Boyle, Note, It’s Not Easy Bein’ Green: The Psychology of Racism, 
Environmental Discrimination, and the Argument for Modernizing Equal Protection Analysis, 46 
VAND. L. REV. 937, 964–65 (1993). 
 214. Id. at 965. 
 215. See Ian F. Haney Lopez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of 
Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1806 (2000); see also Linda Hamilton Krieger, The 
Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment 
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1186 (1995). 
 216. Lawrence, supra note 200, at 322; see also Miriam Kim, Note and Comment, 
Discrimination in the Wen Ho Lee Case: Reinterpreting the Intent Requirement in Constitutional 
and Statutory Race Discrimination Cases, 9 ASIAN L.J. 117, 139 (2002). 
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Secondly, since most governmental decisions are made by a group and not 
by individuals, the governmental action results from the interaction of multiple 
motives.217  Thus, it is almost impossible to attribute discriminatory intent to a 
group of people.218  As a result, each individual decision-maker will be able to 
argue that his action was based upon racially neutral considerations.219  
Thirdly, in this day of political correctness, governmental decision-makers will 
be sure to hide any improper motives that may have contributed to their 
actions.220  Moreover, opponents of the discriminatory intent requirement 
argue that the negative impact of unequal treatment is felt by the affected 
community regardless of whether that negative impact was caused by 
intentional or unintentional discrimination.221 
 
 217. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224–25 (1971).  Justice Black stated: 
First, it is extremely difficult for a court to ascertain the motivation, or collection of 
different motivations, that lie behind a legislative enactment. . . . It is difficult or 
impossible for any court to determine the “sole” or “dominant” motivation behind the 
choices of a group of legislators.  Furthermore, there is an element of futility in a judicial 
attempt to invalidate a law because of the bad motives of its supporters.  If the law is 
struck down for this reason, rather than because of its facial content or effect, it would 
presumably be valid as soon as the legislature or relevant governing body repassed it for 
different reasons. 
Id. 
 218. See BULLARD, supra note 13, at 15 (“Institutional racism continues to affect policy 
decisions related to the enforcement of environmental regulations.”); see also Rebecca Hanner 
White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?: Discrimination in Multi-Actor 
Employment Decision Making, 61 LA. L. REV. 495, 530 (2001); Evan Tsen Lee & Ashutosh 
Bhagwat, The McClesky Puzzle: Remedying Prosecutorial Discrimination Against Black Victims 
in Capital Sentencing, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 145, 154–55 (1998); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory 
Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 956–58 (1989) (addressing the futility 
of inquiring if a group consciously decided to engage in intentional discrimination). 
 219. See East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass’n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning 
Comm’n, 706 F. Supp. 880, 883 n.4 (M.D. Ga. 1989).  According to the court, on the record, 
three commissioners stated a neutral reason for voting in favor of or against the approval of the 
landfill project.  Id.  Commissioner Pippinger contended that he voted to approve the application 
after he reviewed “all of the details[,] the use of the land and the facts and conclusions . . . .”  Id.  
In voting against the project, Commissioner Ingram stated that the proposed project did not 
satisfy the need for a comprehensive waste management plan.  Commission Ingram also objected 
to reconsidering the application after it had already been denied.  Id.  Commissioner Cullinan 
voted to grant the landfill permit and stated: “We can’t rule on sites until they are brought to use.  
This site was brought to us. . . . If others are brought to us in North Macon, South Macon, West 
Macon, we have to be as deliberative and as thoughtful and make an independent assessment 
there to see whether in fact the land use is adequate.”  Id. 
 220. Lawrence, supra note 200, at 319. 
 221. Id. 
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A. A Few of the Proposed Alternatives to the Intent Requirement 
Since most discrimination is not blatant and decision-makers usually do 
not leave a paper trail showing discriminatory motive, it will continue to be 
difficult for environmental discrimination plaintiffs to meet the intent 
threshold.  In addition, at the time the Court established conscious 
discriminatory intent as the standard equal protection plaintiffs had to meet, in 
many parts of the country overt racism was commonplace.222  However, over 
the last few decades, society has indicated that overt racism will not be 
tolerated.223  Thus, in this day of political correctness,224 the incidences of 
overt racism by persons in the public eye are immediately condemned.225  
Today, most of the racism in the country is covert.226  Hence, the plaintiffs in 
equal protection cases have an almost insurmountable task when it comes to 
proving blatant intent to discriminate on the part of the governmental actor.227  
Even if environmental discrimination plaintiffs are able to put together a 
forceful case, the chances of winning are slim because circumstantial evidence 
is capable of being interpreted in so many different ways.  As a result, the 
environmental discrimination plaintiff is forced to suffer tremendous harm on a 
daily basis.228 
Regardless of the decision-maker’s intent, minorities feel the impact of 
discriminatory environmental practices.  It is of no help or solace to the 
communities whose children are poisoned by lead,229 or to families 
 
 222. See Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and Self-Critical Analysis: The Case for a 
Qualified Evidentiary Equal Employment Opportunity Privilege, 74 WASH. L. REV. 913, 928 
(1999); see also Richard Dvorak, Cracking the Code: “De-coding”  Colorblind Slurs During the 
Congressional Crack Cocaine Debates, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 611, 617–18 (2000). 
 223. See Roger I. Abrams, Off His Rocker: Sports Discipline and Labor Arbitration, 11 
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 167, 171 (2001).  In evaluating the harshness of John Rocker’s 
punishment for making racist statements in a magazine interview, the author notes “Rocker’s was 
the harshest player discipline for off-work behavior unconnected to misconduct such as substance 
abuse and gambling. . . . Ty Cobb was a notorious racist during a time when the country accepted 
such sentiments as natural and appropriate.”  Id. 
 224. See Charles R. Calleros, Reconciliation of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties After R.A.V. 
v. City of St. Paul: Free Speech, Antiharrassment Policies, Multicultural Education, and Political 
Correctness at Arizona State University, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 1205, 1263–64 (1992). 
 225. See Ross D. Petty et al., Regulating Target Marketing and Other Race-Based Advertising 
Practices, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 335, 337–338 (2003) (discussing the treatment of Trent Lott 
after his remarks at Strom Thurman’s birthday party). 
 226. Jill E. Evans, Challenging the Racism in Environmental Racism: Redefining the Concept 
of Intent, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1219, 1275 (1998). 
 227. Id. 
 228. See Nelson, supra note 211, at 344. 
 229. See Jane Schukoske, The Evolving Paradigm of Laws on Lead-Based Paint: From Code 
Violation to Environmental Hazard, 45 S.C. L. REV. 511, 516 (1994).  “A disproportionately high 
number of ethnic minority children live in poverty, in dilapidated housing, and are poisoned by 
lead paint.”  Id.  (citing KAREN L. FLORINI ET AL., ENVTL. DEFENSE FUND, LEGACY OF LEAD: 
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experiencing various illnesses as a result of exposure to toxic emissions, that 
the polluter did not overtly single out minorities to be almost the exclusive 
recipients of the pollution.230  Moreover, the discriminatory intent requirement 
ignores the fact that racist decisions may be motivated by overt racism or the 
unconscious racist attitudes of the decision-maker.  Numerous commentators 
have argued that proof of discriminatory intent dooms many equal protection 
cases because unconscious racism, on an individual and an institutional level, 
is widespread in our society.231 
The criticism of the intent requirement has led to numerous suggestions for 
replacement standards.  Some commentators have argued that the 
discriminatory intent requirement should be totally abandoned when legislative 
actions have a substantial disparate impact on a suspect class.232  Others, who 
disagree with the intent requirement, appear to oppose the standard of proof the 
plaintiffs have to meet to be successful.  Thus, they have proposed alternatives 
that focus upon the type of information the plaintiffs should have to submit to 
prove discriminatory intent.233  This section offers a brief summary of a few of 
the suggested proposals. 
 
AMERICA’S CONTINUING EPIDEMIC OF CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING, Appendix 1, Table A-1).  
“In 1988, in metropolitan areas of more than one million, approximately 68% of black children 
and 36% of white children in households earning under $6,000 have blood lead levels in excess 
of fifteen milligrams per deciliter, in households with incomes between $6,000 and $14,999, the 
estimates are 54% of black children and 23% of white children.”  Schukoske, supra, at 516–17 
n.30. 
 230. According to a study released by the Citizens’ Environmental Coalition, an advocacy 
group located in New York, minority neighborhoods are more likely than white neighborhoods to 
be the location of environmental hazards, including incinerators and bus depots.  Paul H.B. Shin, 
A Cloud Over Minority Nabes, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 12, 2004, at 28. 
 231. E.g., Valerie P. Mahoney, Environmental Justice: From Partial Victories To Complete 
Solutions, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 361, 366 (1999); see also Marguerite A. Driessen, Toward a 
More Realistic Standard for Proving Discriminatory Intent, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 
19, 41 (2002) (analyzing Charles Lawrence’s notion that unconscious racism is “just as 
pernicious an evil as deliberate discrimination, and . . . has no place in governmental action”); 
Colopy, supra note 33, at 151–52 (illustrating that a required showing of intent for redress in 
cases of institutional racism “legitimizes the presumption that conscious racism is blameworthy 
but unconscious racism is not”); Boyle, supra note 213, at 938 (discussing how racist attitudes 
can unconsciously influence decisional actions and informational processing, contributing to the 
incomplete understanding of racial discrimination). 
 232. See Boyle, supra note 213, at 980–81 (proposing the replacement of the intent 
requirement with an intermediate test in which plaintiffs would have to show that the actions of 
the government caused significant disparate impact on a suspect class). 
 233. See Lawrence, supra note 200, at 355–58 (proposing that plaintiff submit data on 
“cultural meaning” of a racially discriminatory act). 
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1. Abandonment of the Intent Requirement (Throwing Out the Baby) 
a. Intermediate Scrutiny Theory 
Commentator Edward P. Boyle proposes that courts abandon the intent 
standard and apply an intermediate level of scrutiny to all legislative decisions 
that have a substantial disparate impact on suspect classes.234  In evaluating its 
decision, courts would ask whether the structure of the decision-making 
process was likely to generate a disparate racial outcome.235  Under an 
intermediate-level scrutiny approach, the plaintiffs would first have to show 
that the governmental act had a significant disparate impact upon the suspect 
class of which they were members.236  The class members would meet that 
burden by showing that an extraordinarily large number or percentage of class 
members were disadvantaged by the decision-makers’ actions.237  If the class 
members did not meet their burden on the disparate impact issue, the decision-
makers would prevail.238  In the event that the class members were able to 
sustain their burden of proof, the decision-makers could still defeat the class 
members’ claim by proving that a significant number or percentage of the 
persons similarly impacted were not members of a suspect class.  If the court 
found the evidence of impact to be inconclusive, it would look at similar past 
actions by the decision-makers to determine if any of those prior decisions had 
a disparate racial impact.239 
If the class members successfully demonstrated that only the members of 
their class suffered the disparate impact, the decision-makers would bear the 
burden of proving that the class members’ interests were represented 
adequately in the decision-making process.240  The decision-makers could 
satisfy their burden by showing that the class representatives were part of the 
decision-making process and that those representatives were fully informed of 
the threat the decision posed to the class members.241  Subsequently, the 
burden would shift to the class members to prove that their interests were 
inadequately represented or that the decision-making process was defective.242 
In evaluating the adequacy of representation, the court would consider the 
following factors: (1) the number of suspect class representatives who were 
actually decision-makers or otherwise substantially involved in the decision-
making process; (2) the process by which the representatives were chosen; (3) 
 
 234. See Boyle, supra note 213, at 980–81. 
 235. Id. at 980. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. at 980–81. 
 238. Id. at 981. 
 239. Boyle, supra note 213, at 981. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
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the level of communication between the impacted parties and their 
representatives; (4) the quality of information made available to those 
impacted and their representatives; (5) the amount of consideration that the 
decision-makers gave to less intrusive options; and (6) the incentives of the 
representatives, if any, that might have run counter to the interests of the 
impacted group.243 
The court’s finding on the representation would determine the level of 
scrutiny the court would apply to the challenged decision.244  If the court 
concluded that the interests of the impacted group were adequately represented 
and not hampered by deficiencies in the decision-making process, the decision-
makers would only have to show that they had a rational basis for making their 
decision.245  Conversely, if the court found that suspect class representatives 
did not adequately participate in the decision-making process, it would 
carefully examine the decision to determine if the decision-makers had given 
adequate consideration to the interests of those impacted.246  The court would 
weigh the severity of the disparate impact on the class members against the 
extent of the inadequate representation and nature of the governmental interest 
at stake.247  Since, in most cases, the class members would lack access to 
evidence regarding the decision-making process, the court would presume that 
the decision-makers’ decision was discriminatory because of the inadequate 
representation.248  The decision-makers could rebut this presumption by 
presenting evidence that they considered the impacted group’s interests despite 
the inadequacy of representation or that the decision was supported by a 
compelling government interest.249  In order for the class members to support 
their case, they would submit evidence of discrimination in the decision-
making process along with a history of the decision-makers’ actual 
discrimination.250  Under this test, the court’s focus would be on whether the 
decision-making process sufficiently protected the concerns of the impacted 
class members.251 
The value of this proposed test is that it would require courts to do a 
thorough evaluation of the decision-making process instead of just focusing on 
the individual placement decision.252  This probing would benefit the plaintiff 
and the public.  The plaintiff would benefit because a critical analysis of the 
 
 243. Id. at 981–82. 
 244. Boyle, supra note 213, at 982. 
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 246. Id. 
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decision-making process is more likely to reveal evidence of racial bias on the 
part of the decision-maker.  In addition, if persons making environmental siting 
decisions knew that the process, as well as the decision, was subject to judicial 
scrutiny, they would probably take precautions to ensure the fairness of the 
process. 
In the environmental context, this would mean that the decision-makers 
would take steps to ensure that members of the impacted community are 
represented in the decision-making process.253  Under the current system, 
decision-makers often choose to approve the placement of environmental 
hazards in the communities where they are likely to encounter the least amount 
of resistance.  If the interests of persons in minority communities are fully 
represented in the process, decision-makers may be hesitant to repeatedly place 
environmental hazards in their communities. 
Application of Boyle’s proposed test would benefit the public because it 
would force the decision-makers to make more informed placement choices 
and to fully consider the consequences of their actions.  Further, if the 
decision-making process does not have the appearance of impropriety, there 
may be a decline in the number of lawsuits filed against the governmental 
entity.  Thus, the resources spent defending lawsuits may be available to fund 
projects that benefit the community. 
The main weakness of this proposed test is that it recommends that the 
court apply a standard that is less than strict scrutiny to cases involving 
allegations of racial discrimination.254  In those types of cases, the government 
should always have to satisfy the strict scrutiny requirement.255  Additionally, 
Boyle’s theory may be just as burdensome on the environmental discrimination 
plaintiff as the current intent requirement.  In order to meet his or her 
evidentiary burden under Boyle’s test, the plaintiff would have to submit a 
large amount of detailed information to the court.  If the plaintiff has access to 
that kind of information, he or she would probably be able to satisfy the 
discriminatory intent requirement as it is currently applied. 
The problem minorities face is the cumulative impact of the placement of 
several environmental hazards in their communities.  Therefore, any legal tool 
that permits courts to evaluate the decision-making process instead of the 
isolated placement decision will be beneficial to persons fighting 
environmental discrimination.  On balance, implementation of Boyle’s test 
 
 253. See id. at 984–87 (analyzing two examples of possible inadequate representation of a 
suspect class under the intermediate scrutiny theory). 
 254. See Boyle, supra note 213, at 981–82 (proposing that the court apply a rational basis or 
intermediate scrutiny standard when evaluating a case depending on the facts). 
 255. See Johnson v. California, 125 S.Ct. 2410, 2419 (2005) (discussing the importance of 
applying strict scrutiny in cases involving government-imposed racial classifications). 
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would provide more benefits than burdens to the persons combating 
environmental discrimination. 
b. Environmental Tort Theory 
Professor Kathy Seward Northern proposes creating a new tort to deal with 
environmental discrimination issues.256  The tort would be the “intent to cause 
racially disproportionate exposure to environmental burdens.”257  Under 
Professor Northern’s theory, an owner or operator of an environmental hazard 
would be subject to liability if his intentional conduct imposed a “racially 
disproportionate environmental burden.”258  The owner or operator would be 
liable for “resulting bodily harm, mental distress, or property damage.”259  The 
plaintiff would have to prove that the owner or operator intended to impose the 
racially disproportionate environmental burden.260 
Professor Northern proposes using a different definition of intent than the 
one that is currently required in equal protection cases.261  The proposed 
replacement definition of intent would be based upon tort law principles.262  
Thus, in the context of this new tort, intent would include a purpose or desire 
to bring about a given consequence and a substantial certainty that such a 
consequence would occur.263  Courts would apply a reasonable person standard 
in evaluating whether the defendant had the necessary intent.264  Therefore, if a 
reasonable person in the actor’s position believed that his action was 
substantially certain to cause a harmful or offensive contact, the defendant 
would be treated as though he had intended that result.265 
One purpose of Professor Northern’s proposed tort is to encourage owners 
and operators of facilities currently located in minority communities to comply 
fully with environmental regulations.266  A second purpose is to discourage 
owners and operators of environmental hazards from concentrating such 
hazards in minority communities and from placing the hazards in 
geographically or geologically unsuitable areas.267 
If Professor Northern’s proposal is adopted, it will provide more options 
for persons combating environmental discrimination.  The environmentally 
 
 256. Northern supra note 15, at 577–78. 
 257. Id. at 578. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. 
 260. See id. 
 261. Northern, supra note 15, at 583. 
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 264. See id. at 574. 
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discriminated-against plaintiff will benefit from the application of tort law 
because tort law has a more expansive definition of intent.  In tort law there is 
a presumption that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of 
his action.268  Therefore, intent is attributed to a person if he or she acted with 
purpose or design or with substantial certainty that the result would occur.269  
Expansion of the definition of intent will enable courts to consider unconscious 
racism.  As a consequence, decision-makers will give more consideration to 
the impact their decisions may have on minority communities.270 
Another positive aspect of Professor Northern’s theory is that it would 
place the financial burden on the entities that are directly responsible for the 
disproportionate placement of the environmental hazard.  The owner or 
operator of the facility causing the harm should have to compensate the 
plaintiffs.  Owners and operators are in the best position to make sure that a 
facility is as environment-friendly as possible.  Those persons are also the ones 
with the most information about the impact an environmental hazard will have 
on members of the community. 
One of the drawbacks of relying on tort law to remedy the disproportionate 
placement of environmental hazards in minority communities is that the 
plaintiffs will be deprived of the protections that minority persons receive in 
constitutional cases.  Thus, the standard that decision-makers will have to meet 
to justify their actions will be less stringent.  In addition, the remedies available 
under tort law may be limited.  The primary remedy available under tort law is 
usually damages.271  In environmental cases, the plaintiffs may not suffer 
damages until several years after they have been exposed to the hazards.  At 
that time, the statute of limitations may prevent the plaintiffs from bringing a 
cause of action.272  Moreover, the plaintiffs’ initial injuries may be minor.  
 
 268. Cheek v. Hamlin, 277 N.E.2d 620, 634 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972). 
 269. “Substantial certainty” has been described as more than “mere knowledge and 
appreciation of a risk.”  Pariseau v. Wedge Prods., Inc., 522 N.E.2d 511, 514 (Ohio 1988) 
(quoting W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER 
AND KEETON ON TORTS 36 (5th ed. 1984)). 
 270. The possibility of tort liability may serve as a deterrent to decision-makers who are 
inclined to place environmental hazards in minority communities that are already heavily 
polluted.  See Northern, supra note 15, at 578–79. 
 271. JERRY J. PHILLIPS ET AL., TORT LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 607 (3d ed. 
2002). 
 272. ARTHUR BEST & DAVID W. BARNES, BASIC TORT LAW: CASES, STATUTES, AND 
PROBLEMS 344 (2003).  “A statute of limitations relates to the time a plaintiff should reasonably 
have known that he or she had a legal claim and bars a claim unless it is filed within a certain 
period after that time.”  Id.; see also GEORGE C. CHRISTIE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS 775 (3d ed. 1997). 
In many jurisdictions, the typical two-year tort statute of limitations is a clock that starts 
running on the date of “injury” or “occurrence.”  If “occurrence” could be understood to 
mean the date of exposure, or if “injury” could be interpreted as the first time when the 
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However, after the case has been litigated and resolved, the plaintiff may suffer 
further damages.  The plaintiffs may be barred from seeking damages from an 
injury that occurred as a result of the previously litigated incident.273  Given 
the changes that have occurred because of tort reform, the use of tort law may 
be a limited solution to the problem of the inequitable placement of 
environmental hazards.274 
Nonetheless, implementation of the proposed environmental tort would 
give the minority community another weapon to fight the disproportionate 
placement of environmental hazards in their neighborhoods.  Given the lack of 
success plaintiffs have had utilizing the Equal Protection Clause, the 
availability of a tort cause of action would be a welcomed addition to the legal 
landscape. 
2. Modification of the Intent Requirement (Changing the Bathwater) 
a. Cultural Meaning Theory275 
According to Professor Charles Lawrence, unconscious racism results 
because “Americans share a common historical and cultural heritage in which 
racism has played and still plays a dominant role.  Because of this shared 
experience, we also inevitably share many ideas, attitudes, and beliefs that 
attach significance to an individual’s race and induce negative feelings and 
opinions about nonwhites.”276  Professor Lawrence proposes replacing the 
discriminatory intent requirement with a cultural meaning test that focuses 
upon unconscious racism.277  In applying the test, courts would look to see if 
 
toxic substance begins to have any physiological effects, then the plaintiff might find that 
the clock has run out by the time she actually contracts the disease. 
Id. 
 273. See CHRISTIE ET AL., supra note 272, at 775 (“Under traditional tort rules, a plaintiff 
may not ‘split’ her claim and later seek future damages in a different suit.  Rather, she must bring 
her suit within the statute of limitations, and then seek in that suit all damages flowing from that 
injury.”). 
 274. See generally Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children, 
and the Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263 (2004) (discussing the damage caps established under new 
tort reform measures).  See also CHRISTIE ET AL., supra note 272, at 904–17. 
 275. In his 1994 article, Marco Masoni, then a student at Georgetown University Law Center, 
applied the cultural meaning test to an environmental discrimination case.  As the result of his 
analysis, Masoni concluded that “[t]he cultural meaning test forces one to take a hard look at a 
case and, if necessary, probe beneath the apparent neutrality of decisions which 
disproportionately impact minorities.”  Marco Masoni, The Green Badge of Slavery, 2 GEO. J. ON 
FIGHTING POVERTY 97, 113 (1994). 
 276. Lawrence, supra note 200, at 322. 
 277. Id. at 355–62. 
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the governmental action conveyed a symbolic message to which the culture 
attaches racial significance.278 
As a part of that analysis, the court would consider evidence regarding the 
historical and social context in which the decision was made and 
implemented.279  If, based upon that review, the court decides by a 
preponderance of the evidence that a significant portion of the population 
would think of the governmental action in racial terms, the court would 
presume that “socially shared, unconscious racial attitudes made evident by the 
action’s meaning had influenced the decisionmakers.”280  As a consequence, 
the court would infer discriminatory intent and apply heightened scrutiny.281 
To illustrate his theory, Professor Lawrence gave the example of a 
government decision to construct a wall between white and black 
communities.282  According to Professor Lawrence, the construction of the 
wall would have a “cultural meaning growing out of a long history of whites’ 
need to separate themselves from blacks as a symbol of their superiority.”283  
Since the construction of the wall would conjure up racial inferiority, it would 
burden blacks living in the affected communities and reinforce a system of 
racial discrimination.284  Therefore, the blacks in those communities should not 
have to prove discriminatory intent in order to get judicial redress because the 
court should assume that the decision to construct the wall was based upon 
race.285 
This test could provide some salvation for persons trying to combat 
environmental discrimination.  In order to get around the discriminatory intent 
requirement, the plaintiff would have to prove that the decision to place the 
environmental hazard in a minority neighborhood had a cultural meaning that 
was based upon the race of the persons living in the impacted area.  The 
placement of an environmental hazard in a minority neighborhood could have 
a cultural meaning growing out of a long history of whites’ beliefs that 
minority neighborhoods are not fit for anything other than dumping.286  In 
addition, the placement of environmental hazards in a predominately minority 
 
 278. Id. at 356. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Lawrence, supra note 200, at 356. 
 282. Id. at 357. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. at 358. 
 285. See id. at 356–58. 
 286. See BULLARD, supra note 13, at 5 (discussing the fact that toxic dumps and other locally 
unwanted land uses (LULUs) have historically been placed in minority and low-income 
communities). 
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neighborhood may further promote the opinion that minorities are “second 
class” citizens who do not deserve to live in clean, safe neighborhoods.287 
The cultural meaning test may impose a heavy burden on the plaintiff.  In 
some situations, that burden may be just as arduous as the one environmental 
discrimination plaintiffs currently face when trying to prove discriminatory 
intent.  The burden of proof will be difficult to meet because the cultural 
meaning test employs a subjective standard.288  A person’s background and life 
experiences will impact the meaning that he or she gives to a particular action.  
In the environmental arena, the negative cultural meaning that is attached to a 
placement decision will not be as apparent as in segregation cases.  Therefore, 
in order to prove the cultural meaning attached to a particular placement 
decision, the plaintiff would have to acquire the services of an expert such as a 
cultural anthropologist.  Low-income persons and minorities usually do not 
have the financial resources to hire expert witnesses.  In addition, since cultural 
anthropology is not an exact science, the case may be complicated by a battle 
of expert witnesses.  Another concern is that the cultural meaning test may be 
considered vague and speculative because it does not state the objective 
parameters that are necessary to prove cultural meaning. 
Ultimately, the cultural meaning test is preferable to the current method of 
determining intent in environmental discrimination cases.  Application of the 
cultural meaning test will allow the court to expose unconscious racism.  The 
cultural meaning test may also be used as a tool for educating decision-makers 
about unconscious racism.  Most decision-makers may be unaware that their 
underlying biases are influencing the choices they make in their official 
capacities.  Acknowledgment of the cultural meaning phenomenon may lead 
decision-makers to take steps to make the process more inclusive.  Initially, it 
may be difficult to attach cultural meaning to government actions, however, 
after a few cases, the necessary data will be available for use by future 
plaintiffs. 
b. Reversing the Groups Theory 
Professor David Strauss proposes what he calls a “reversing the groups” 
test.289  The test would be used to define what discriminatory intent means.  
Under the test, courts would ask the following question: Would the 
government actor have made the same decision if he had known that the 
challenged governmental action would have adversely impacted whites instead 
 
 287. See id.  (citing Robert Bullard & Beverly Hendrix Wright, Environmentalism and the 
Politics of Equity: Emergent Trends in the Black Community, 12 MID-AM. REV. OF SOC. 21, 28 
(1987), and emphasizing that the disdain for minorities led to the “Place in Blacks’ Back Yard” 
(PIBBY) principle). 
 288. See Lawrence, supra note 200, at 355–56. 
 289. Strauss, supra note 218, at 956–59. 
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of blacks?290  Another way to put the question is: Would the government have 
made a decision that negatively affected the plaintiffs if they were members of 
a different race?  If the answer to the question is no, the court should decide 
that the decision was made with discriminatory intent.291 
If this test is applied to an environmental discrimination case, courts would 
ask: Would the government actor have decided to place the environmental 
hazard in the community if the population of the community was 
predominately white?  In order to meet his or her burden of proof under this 
test, the environmental discrimination plaintiff would have to show that the 
decision-maker chose to place the hazard in a minority neighborhood even 
though there was a non-minority neighborhood suitable for the project.  
Application of this test would have been helpful to the plaintiffs in the East 
Bibb case because they had evidence that the county had previously refused to 
site the landfill in a predominately white neighborhood.292  The shortcoming of 
the proposed test is the fact that the court may not be able to determine the true 
answer to the question because the government actors can always come up 
with a non-discriminatory reason for environmental placement decisions. 
Like under the current intent requirement, the “reversing the groups” test 
will place the plaintiff in the difficult position of attempting to attribute a 
single motive to a group of people.  Nonetheless, the “reversing the groups” 
theory will force decision-makers to at least consider non-minority areas when 
they are making placement decisions.  Having to answer the question posed by 
this theory in court may be an incentive for decision-makers to consider factors 
other than race when selecting locations for environmental hazards. 
3. My Fair Share Theory 
The cement that holds our society together is the belief that the foundation 
of our society is justice.293  True justice cannot be achieved if burdens are 
placed on a few persons in order to benefit the majority of the population.294  I 
arrived at my theory by relying on the readings of John Rawls.  In A Theory of 
 
 290. Id. at 956–57. 
 291. Id. at 957. 
 292. East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass’n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning 
Comm’n, 706 F. Supp. 880, 884 (M.D. Ga. 1989). 
 293. In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls states, “[A] society is well-ordered when it is not only 
designed to advance the good of its members but when it is also effectively regulated by a public 
conception of justice.”  JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 4 (rev. ed., The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press 1999) (1971). 
 294. Id. at 3. 
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Justice, John Rawls characterizes justice as fairness.295  Hence, a society 
cannot be just without a concept of fairness.296  According to Rawls: 
[A] person is required to do his part as defined by the rules of an institution297 
when two conditions are met: first, the institution is just (or fair), that is, it 
satisfies the two principles of justice;298 and second, one has voluntarily 
accepted the benefits of the arrangement or taken advantage of the 
opportunities it offers to further one’s interests.299 
Rawls explains that, in a situation where a group of persons are 
cooperating to achieve a goal, all of the persons should make sacrifices, 
including restricting their liberties, to benefit the group as a whole.  In that 
circumstance, the members of the group will be equally burdened and equally 
benefited.300  Rawls concludes, “We are not to gain from the cooperative 
labors of others without doing our fair share.”301  In the land use context, the 
concept of fair share developed as a potential solution to exclusionary 
zoning.302  In addressing the issue of exclusionary zoning, one court 
determined that each community has an obligation to take its “fair share” of 
low-income persons.303  In the environmental law context, each community has 
the responsibility to take its fair share of the environmental hazards located in 
the area.304 
 
 295. Id. at 10. 
 296. Id. at 11. Rawls states that the theory of “‘justice as fairness’ . . . conveys the idea that 
the principles of justice are agreed to in an initial situation that is fair.”  Id. 
 297. Rawls refers to an institution as “a public system of rules which defines offices and 
positions with their rights and duties, powers and immunities, and the like.”  Id. at 47. 
 298. The two principles of justice for institutions are the following: 
FIRST PRINCIPLE 
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic 
liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. 
SECOND PRINCIPLE 
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: 
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings 
principle, and 
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity. 
 RAWLS, supra note 293, at 266. 
 299. Id. at 96. 
 300. Id. (citing H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 185f (1955)). 
 301. Id. at 96. 
 302. “Exclusionary zoning” refers to the practice of closing an entire community to unwanted 
groups such as low-income and minority persons.  Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of 
Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1870 (1994). 
 303. See S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 724–25 (N.J. 
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975). 
 304. When discussing “fair treatment,” the Environmental Protection Agency states that “no 
group of people, including racial, ethnic, or socioeconomic group should bear a disproportionate 
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Because it is the antithesis of fairness, discrimination is a termite that eats 
at the foundation of society.  Therefore, in order for our society to remain 
intact, all forms of discrimination must be exterminated.  The Equal Protection 
Clause was enacted to eliminate discrimination by not allowing similarly 
situated persons to be treated differently.305  Consequently, the quest for justice 
should be the desire of all courts, especially when reviewing an allegation of 
discrimination. 
In the United States, it is clear that environmental hazards are not 
distributed equally.306  Under the current system, the facilities needed to 
provide services for the entire community are usually placed in areas 
containing populations that are mostly low-income and minority.307  Thus, 
low-income and minority persons bear the burden of environmental pollution 
while the majority of the population receives the benefits provided by the 
pollution producing facilities.308  Despite recognition of the fact that low-
income and minority persons are disproportionately impacted by 
environmental pollution, persons seeking a remedy in an environmental 
discrimination case have to overcome a big hurdle—proving discriminatory 
intent.309  They must prove that the government actors who made the decision 
to place the environmental hazard in their community were motivated by 
discriminatory intent.310 
 
share of the negative environmental consequences resulting from industrial, municipal, and 
commercial operations or the execution of federal, state, local, and tribal programs and policies.”  
Suzanne Smith, Note, Current Treatment of Environmental Justice Claims: Plaintiffs Face a 
Dead End in the Courtroom, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 223, 223 (2002) (quoting EPA, INTERIM 
FINAL GUIDANCE FOR INCORPORATING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CONCERNS IN EPA’S NEPA 
COMPLIANCE ANALYSIS 2 (1997)). 
 305. See Green v. City of Tucson, 340 F.3d 891, 896 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing City of Cleburne 
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)). 
 306. See Mohai & Bryant, supra note 27, at 921–22. 
 307. For example, in New York State, “communities with a minority population of at least 70 
percent have about 18 percent of the state’s air pollution sites but only make up about .5 percent 
of the land area.”  Danita Chambers, Pollution High Where Income Is Low, TIMES UNION, Mar. 
12, 2004, at B3; see also Jay Rey, Watchdog Group Accuses State of Environmental Racism, THE 
BUFFALO NEWS, Mar. 12, 2004, at B22 (discussing the fact that in New York State, members of  
“minority communities are exposed to a disproportionate amount of air pollution . . . .”). 
 308. See Harvey L. White, Race, Class, and Environmental Hazards, in ENVIRONMENTAL 
INJUSTICES, POLITICAL STRUGGLES 65, 67 (David E. Camacho ed., 1998) (stating that “in 
Detroit, a person of color’s chance of living within a mile of a hazardous waste facility is four 
times greater than a white American’s”). 
 309. See R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1149 (E.D. Va. 1991); see also Luke W. 
Cole & Shelia R. Foster, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE OF 
THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 64 (2001). 
 310. East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass’n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning 
Comm’n, 706 F. Supp. 880, 884 (M.D. Ga. 1989). 
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The discriminatory intent requirement is such a high standard that it flies in 
the face of fairness and prevents plaintiffs in environmental discrimination 
cases from receiving justice.  Nonetheless, I am not proposing that the 
discriminatory intent requirement be replaced with a different standard.  A 
legal standard should not be thrown out simply because it is applied in a 
manner that disadvantages one side.  I am proposing that the courts change the 
manner in which they evaluate whether or not the plaintiff has proven 
discriminatory intent. 
A disparate impact standard would tilt the table too heavily in favor of the 
plaintiffs in environmental discrimination cases.  It is usually pretty easy to 
prove disparate impact because it is well documented that minorities are 
disproportionately impacted by environmental hazards.311  Disparate impact 
usually becomes a problem when the community feels the cumulative impact 
of several environmental hazards.  Thus, application of a disparate impact 
standard would require current decision-makers to be held accountable for the 
actions of their predecessors.312 
Current decision-makers should not be held responsible for past decisions 
to place environmental hazards unless they acted with knowledge that their 
placement decision would make the situation worse.  A person should only be 
held liable if there is some level of culpability on his or her part.  In order to be 
held liable under the Equal Protection Clause, the persons who made the 
challenged decision should have some actual knowledge or attributable 
knowledge of the harm their action would cause to persons living in the 
impacted neighborhood.  On the other hand, strict application of the 
discriminatory intent standard places an onerous burden on the environmental 
discrimination plaintiff and advantages the decision-maker.313 
The intent standard should be maintained to avoid holding persons liable 
for harms they did not intend to cause.  Nonetheless, intent should be defined 
broadly enough to encompass both conscious and unconscious racism.314  The 
underlying basis of my proposal is fairness315 and social cooperation.316  
 
 311. See Centner et al., supra note 32, at 127–28. 
 312. Lawrence, supra note 200, at 320. 
 313. See Mitchell A. Horwich, Comment, Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 
Closing of a Public Hospital, 1981 DUKE L.J. 1033, 1043–45 (1981). 
 314. Lawrence, supra note 200, at 324–25. 
 315. See RAWLS, supra note 293, at 301–08 (discussing why fairness is of great importance in 
a just society). 
 316. See John Rawls, The Basic Liberties and Their Priority, in LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND 
LAW 2, 14 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1987). 
The notion of social cooperation is not simply that of coordinated social activity 
efficiently organized and guided by publicly recognized rules to achieve some overall 
end.  Social cooperation is always for mutual benefit and this implies that it involves two 
elements: the first is a shared notion of fair terms of cooperation, which each participant 
may reasonably be expected to accept, provided that everyone else likewise accepts them.  
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Fairness should play a part in any equal protection analysis because the 
amendment was enacted to address the issue of inequality.317 
For years, the United States was segregated on the basis of race and class.  
Persons relied on the Equal Protection clause to remedy the harms caused by 
segregation.318  Currently, a significant number of minority persons are being 
segregated in neighborhoods that are plagued with environmental hazards.319  
Those persons should be able to more readily avail themselves of the 
safeguards afforded by the Equal Protection Clause. 
Currently, the courts rely on the Arlington Heights factors to determine if 
the plaintiffs have made a prima facie case of discriminatory intent.320  As a 
result, the courts refuse to apply strict scrutiny unless the plaintiff proves that 
discriminatory intent was the motivating factor behind the government 
action.321  It is my contention that fairness dictates that courts evaluate the 
reasonableness322 of the decision to place the environmental hazard in a certain 
 
Fair terms of cooperation articulate an idea of reciprocity and mutuality: all who 
cooperate must benefit, or share in common burdens, in some appropriate fashion judged 
by a suitable benchmark of comparison. 
Id. 
 317. See Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L. REV. 
1, 8 (2000) (claiming that the Equal Protection Clause mandates that the government 
demonstrates equal concern for all citizens); see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 
(1976) (stating that “[t]he central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race”); Jay S. 
Bybee, The Equal Process Clause: A Note on the (Non)Relationship Between Romer v. Evans 
and Hunter v. Erickson, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 201, 205 (1997); Jeanmarie K. Grubert, 
Note, The Rehnquist Court’s Changed Reading of the Equal Protection Clause in the Context of 
Voting Rights, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1819, 1843–44 (1997). 
 318. E.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“[T]he plaintiffs and others 
similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation 
complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”); see also Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (holding that a city which 
closed public swimming pools rather than try to operate them as desegregated did not deny equal 
protection). 
 319. Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Justice for All, in UNEQUAL PROTECTION: 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR 3, 11 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994)  
(stating that “[n]umerous studies[,] dating back to the 1970s, reveal that communities of color 
have borne greater health and environmental risk burdens than has society at large”); see also 
White, supra note 308, at 68–69 (discussing the national pattern of low-income and minorities 
being disproportionately exposed to environmental hazards). 
 320. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–68 (1977); 
see also Johnson v. Bd. of Educ., 188 F. Supp. 2d 944, 970 (C.D. Ill. 2002). 
 321. See, e.g., Anderson ex rel. Dowd v. City of Boston, 375 F.3d 71, 82 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 322. According to John Rawls, 
[R]easonable persons are characterized in two ways: First, they stand ready to offer fair 
terms of social cooperation between equals, and they abide by these terms if others do 
also, even should it be to their advantage not to; second, reasonable persons recognize and 
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area when deciding the issue of discriminatory intent.  To equalize the process, 
the courts should apply an objective reasonableness test to determine if the 
decision-maker may have been motivated by the intent to discriminate.  If the 
plaintiffs are able to show that the decision to place the environmental hazard 
in their neighborhood was presumptively unreasonable, the burden should shift 
to the decision-makers to prove that they were not motivated by discriminatory 
intent. 
Under the test I propose, like in the current system, the initial burden of 
proof would be on the plaintiff to prove the placement decision has a disparate 
impact on a community predominately populated by persons from one racial or 
ethic group.323  The next step would be for the court to ask the following 
question: Was it reasonable to place the environmental hazard in the plaintiff’s 
neighborhood?  In answering the question, the court would start with the 
premise that it is unreasonable to place an environmental hazard in an area that 
is already oversaturated with environmental hazards.  The plaintiff has the 
burden of proving that his/her neighborhood was oversaturated when the 
government actor made the decision to place the new environmental hazard in 
the area.  In order to show over-saturation, the plaintiff must present evidence 
indicating the percentage of the community that lives in the impacted area. 
Then, the plaintiff must show the percentage of the community’s 
environmental hazards324 that are located in the area.  If the plaintiff proves 
that, prior to the placement decision, the percentage of the hazards bore by 
his/her neighborhood was significantly higher than the percentage of the 
community’s population living in the neighborhood, he/she has proven 
oversaturation.  For example, if the impacted neighborhood makes up twenty 
percent of the community’s population and contains sixty-five percent of the 
environmental hazards located in the community, a court should consider the 
area to be oversaturated. An alternative method for determining oversaturation 
may be to focus on the level of pollution in the impacted community.  This 
would cover the cases where a community with fewer environmental hazards 
has more pollution.  For instance, a community with two chemical plants may 
be more polluted than a community with four landfills. 
Once an area is classified as being oversaturated, there should be a 
presumption it is unreasonable to place another environmental hazard in the 
area.  Courts should presume that an unreasonable placement decision was 
 
accept the consequences of the burdens of judgment, which leads to the idea of reasonable 
toleration in a democratic society. 
JOHN RAWLS, THE LAWS OF PEOPLES 177 (1999) (citations omitted).  Based upon Rawls’s 
observations, it is my contention that reasonable persons make reasonable decisions that are fair.  
Thus, the actions of decision-makers should be evaluated using a reasonableness standard. 
 323. See United States v. Hare, 308 F. Supp. 2d 955, 991–92 (D. Neb. 2004). 
 324. Environmental hazards should be broadly defined to include businesses like gas stations 
and salvage yards that require government permission to operate in a certain area. 
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motivated by discriminatory intent.  In order for a court to make the 
presumption, the plaintiff must prove that the decision-maker knew or should 
have known about the racial make-up and the over-saturation of the selected 
area.  Finally, the decision-makers will have the opportunity to rebut the 
presumption.  The decision-makers may be able to rebut the presumption by 
proving that the placement of the new hazard in the community did not make 
the level of pollution in the area any worse.  To prove this point, the decision-
makers will have to rely upon objective scientific and statistical data. 
The fair share test is not a cure-all for environmental discrimination 
plaintiffs.  It still requires them to obtain and submit large volumes of 
information.  However, the information is easily acquired through discovery, 
investigative techniques, and public hearings.  Further, the test only focuses 
upon the placement of additional environmental hazards and does not provide a 
mechanism for removing hazards from minority communities.  Nonetheless, 
the fair share theory is a step towards easing the burdens on minorities. 
CONCLUSION 
The discriminatory intent requirement has caused problems for plaintiffs in 
environmental discrimination cases.  Nonetheless, the requirement of intent for 
proving discrimination has not lost its usefulness.  Hence, the intent 
requirement should not be discarded as the foundation of an equal protection 
case.  Instead courts should change the manner in which they apply the intent 
standard.  Presently, courts look for evidence of purposeful, conscious intent to 
discriminate when deciding if a government actor has violated the Equal 
Protection Clause in siting an environmental hazard.  Courts should view 
“intent” through a broader lens in order to identify situations where the 
government action was motivated by an unconscious intent to discriminate on 
the part of the decision-maker. 
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